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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FUTURE OF 
PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE:  REMOTE 
RECORDING AND OTHER SEARCHES IN 
PUBLIC SPACE 
MARC JONATHAN BLITZ* 
Public video surveillance is changing the way police fight crime and 
terrorism.  This was especially clear in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon 
bombing when law enforcement found images of the two suspects by analyzing 
surveillance images gathered by numerous public and private cameras.  Such 
after-the-fact video surveillance was equally crucial to identifying the culprits 
behind the 2005 London subway bombing.  But the rise of camera 
surveillance, as well as the emergence of drone-based video monitoring and 
GPS-tracking methods, not only provides an important boon for law 
enforcement, but also raises a challenge for constitutional law:  As police gain 
the ability to technologically monitor individuals’ public movements and 
activities, does the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable 
searches” place any hurdles in their way? 
In the 2012 case, United States v. Jones, five justices, in two separate 
concurrences, signaled that it does—at least when the monitoring becomes too 
intense or prolonged.  Their suggestion, however, raises two significant 
problems.  First, it provides no principled basis for marking the point at which 
public surveillance morphs from a means by which police monitor public space 
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into a Fourth Amendment “search.”  Under the “mosaic theory” embraced by 
the D.C. Circuit, such surveillance becomes a search only when it captures 
enough data points from an individual’s public life to construct a detailed 
picture (or “mosaic”) of her movements and associations.  But how detailed 
may such a picture be before it is too detailed?  Do police engage in a search 
simply by watching someone continuously, even if they do so without drones, 
GPS units, or other advanced technology?  Second, the concurring opinions do 
not explain why the Fourth Amendment, if it does cover public surveillance of 
this kind, does not also cover the information-collecting police do when they 
simply watch a pedestrian or a driver.  As Justice Scalia wrote in Jones, 
“Th[e] Court has to date not deviated from the understanding that mere 
visual observation does not constitute a search.”  But if police collect the same 
information from watching a driver as they do from tracking him with GPS 
technology, why would their watching not also be a search? 
This Article proposes a solution to each of these challenges by offering a two-
part definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” in a public space.  Police 
engage in a search when they (1) not only observe, but also record, images or 
sounds of people or events outside police presence; or (2) magnify details on a 
person or documents or other items the person is carrying and thereby reveal 
information that would not otherwise be apparent without a pat-down or a 
stop-and-search of a person’s papers or effects. 
This technology-based or design-based definition of what constitutes a 
“search” avoids the problems that arise when the Fourth Amendment analysis 
regarding what constitutes a “search” is based on an investigation’s duration 
or intensity.  Under the technology-based or designed-based definition, police 
engage in a search as soon as they begin recording remote events or magnifying 
otherwise invisible details, whether they have done so for two minutes or two 
weeks.  Additionally, under this approach, Fourth Amendment constraints 
only apply to surveillance that goes beyond unadorned visual surveillance.  
This test is more workable and more in accord with Fourth Amendment logic.  
Recording is a search because, more than any other element of public 
surveillance, it allows police to engage in dragnet-style investigation of all 
activities in a public space.  By transforming ephemeral occurrences into 
permanent records, recording allows government officials to search public lives 
frame by frame, much like they might search documents file by file.  Certain 
types of magnification could also constitute a search because, just as a 
telescope focused on a home may be functionally equivalent to a home entry 
and search, certain types of magnification may be functionally equivalent to a 
physical search of persons, papers, or effects. 
 
BLITZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2013  12:26 PM 
2013] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FUTURE 23 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction .......................................................................................... 23 
 I. The Nature of the Problem and the Supreme Court’s 
Initial Steps Toward a Solution .................................................. 33 
A. The Problem of Public Surveillance ................................... 33 
B. A Simple, but Flawed, Position:  Treating Open Areas 
as a Fourth Amendment Free Zone ................................... 38 
C. The Supreme Court’s Signals About Fourth 
Amendment Protection in Public Spaces ........................... 44 
 II. Another Solution:  Recording and Magnification Searches .... 48 
A. Constitutionalizing Public Surveillance:  The Proposed 
Test ....................................................................................... 48 
B. Recording as a Dividing Line Between Searches and 
Non-Searches ....................................................................... 55 
C. Extensions:  When Magnification—and Recording—
Should Count as Searches and When They Should Not ... 62 
 III. Objections, Alternatives, and Limits:  Different Ways of 
Defining a “Search” (and a “Reasonable Search”) in Public ... 68 
A. The Objection that the Test Leaves Police Needing 
Greater Freedom To Investigate ......................................... 68 
B. The Objection that the Test Leaves Government with 
Too Much Opportunity for Unjustified Surveillance ........ 71 
1. Expanding the definition of a “search” to cover 
other privacy intrusions by government ....................... 71 
2. More general technology-centered approaches ........... 77 
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 84 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Public surveillance technology is changing the way police fight 
crime and terrorism.  This was clear in the aftermath of the Boston 
Marathon bombing when law enforcement quickly found images of 
the two suspects by “sift[ing] through a mountain of footage” 
gathered by public and private cameras.1  It was also clear in the 
aftermath of the 2005 London subway bombings, when the suspects 
were quickly identified using video surveillance.2  Touting these 
breakthroughs, cities have rushed to embrace camera systems, 
especially in the years after the 9/11 attacks.3  Police in Washington, 
                                                          
 1. Heather Kelly, After Boston:  The Pros and Cons of Surveillance Cameras, CNN 
(Apr. 26, 2013, 7:03 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/26/tech/innovation 
/security-cameras-boston-bombings/index.html. 
 2. ROY COLEMAN & MICHAEL MCCAHILL, SURVEILLANCE & CRIME:  KEY APPROACHES 
TO CRIMINOLOGY 99 (2011). 
 3. See Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom:  Regulating the Use of Video Surveillance of 
Public Places, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755, 761–62 (2008) (explaining that “[p]olice 
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D.C.;4 Chicago;5 and New York6 can now use camera networks to track 
a person strolling down the street.  They can magnify and video 
record her movements, actions, and the details of her vehicle’s 
license plate, or the items she is carrying out of a store.7  In fact, 
government officials do not have to make do with cameras mounted 
on lampposts or buildings.  They can watch and record citizens from 
drones that hover in the skies and glide at the command of a distant 
operator to a new and better vantage point.8 
This revolution in surveillance techniques not only provides an 
important boon for law enforcement. It also raises an important 
challenge for constitutional law.  As police gain the ability to monitor 
citizens’ public movements and activities with increasingly powerful 
cameras, does the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
“unreasonable searches” place any hurdles in their way?  Do police 
need to obtain a warrant based on probable cause or to satisfy some 
other constitutional test of reasonableness before they use a drone to 
track a person’s movements or reconstruct those movements using 
video footage from public cameras? 
                                                          
have praised video surveillance as an effective tool” and have increasingly employed 
more sophisticated surveillance). 
 4. See Mary Beth Sheridan, D.C. Forging Surveillance Network, WASH. POST (May 1, 
2008), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-05-01/news/36809706_1_security-
cameras-closed-circuit-cameras-council-member (discussing centralization of the D.C. 
surveillance camera system, which will integrate “4,500 cameras trained on schools, 
public housing, traffic and government buildings” and allow “round-the-clock 
monitoring of the closed-circuit video systems run by nine city agencies”). 
 5. See William M. Bulkeley, Chicago’s Camera Network Is Everywhere, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 17, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045384045745 
39910412824756.html (“A giant web of video-surveillance cameras has spread across 
Chicago, aiding police in the pursuit of criminals but raising fears that the City of Big 
Shoulders is becoming the City of Big Brother.”). 
 6. See Greg Botelho, New York’s Times Square:  Always a Target, Always Watched, 
CNN (Apr. 25, 2013, 9:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/25/us/new-york-
boston-attack (noting that a “host of cameras” watches Times Square and other areas 
in New York and that among them are cameras that “capture 360-degree images,” 
“shoot from above,” or provide “ground-level surveillance footage”). 
 7. See, e.g., Chicago’s High-Tech Cameras Spark Privacy Fears, PHYS.ORG (Feb. 8, 
2011) http://www.phys.org/news/2011-02-chicago-high-tech-cameras-privacy.htm 
l#nRlv (“At least 1,250 of [Chicago’s cameras] are powerful enough to zoom in and 
read the text of a book.  The [camera] system is also capable of automatically 
tracking people and vehicles out of the range of one camera and into another 
and searching for images of interest like an unattended package or a particular 
license plate.”). 
 8. See Tom Reeve, UAV Video Surveillance Drones Prepped for Take-Off, SECURITY 
NEWS DESK (Feb. 2012), http://www.securitynewsdesk.com/2012/02/03/uav-video-
surveillance-drones-prepped-for-take-off (“Drones . . . may soon be filling our skies, 
engaged in myriad video surveillance tasks.”). 
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Only a few years ago, most courts and lawyers would have answered 
“no.”9  The Fourth Amendment protects people—and their “houses, 
papers, and effects”—from being subject to “unreasonable searches 
and seizures” by government officials.10  Supreme Court Justices as 
well as legal scholars have generally interpreted this provision as 
protecting individuals in the home, or some other space that is 
objectively and reasonably private or personal.11  The Fourth 
Amendment bars the government, for example, from spying upon 
citizens in their living rooms and bedrooms; prying into their wallets, 
purses, or other closed “containers”; and opening sealed envelopes or 
closed drawers to read their private letters and diaries.12  More 
generally, as Justice Harlan emphasized in Katz v. United States,13 the 
government generally does not need a warrant any time it watches us, 
but only when it observes us or examines our belongings after entry 
into places or circumstances in which we have a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”14 
By contrast, the open and public space that we share with others—
in streets, public squares, and parks—is not a private environment.  
We cannot exclude fellow citizens from this space nor command 
them to close their eyes and ears to what is going on around them.  
For example, when a person drives on a highway, she might be seen 
or even followed by other drivers, and some of these other drivers 
might be police officers.  The Supreme Court held in United States v. 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 274, 276 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that GPS surveillance on public roads is not a search), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 
1534 (2012) (mem.); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(same); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(same), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012) (mem.); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 
998 (7th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 
2003) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “activities already 
visible to the public”). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 11. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180–81 (1984) (finding that, 
while the Fourth Amendment limits police investigation of homes and the curtilage 
surrounding the home, it has no application to “open fields”); Orin S. Kerr, Applying 
the Fourth Amendment to the Internet:  A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1010 
(2010) (explicating that the Fourth Amendment does not protect conduct that is out 
in the open, while entering an enclosed space is usually a search). 
 12. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 598 (1991) (White, J., 
dissenting) (“Every citizen clearly has an interest in the privacy of the contents of his 
or her luggage, briefcase, handbag or any other container that conceals private 
papers and effects from public scrutiny.  That privacy interest has been recognized 
repeatedly in cases spanning more than a century.”).  As explained below, individuals 
do receive Fourth Amendment protections from searches in the cars, purses, rented 
lockers, or other areas in public space from which they can exclude outside 
observers, but this does not give them protection from monitoring of their activities 
in the open.  See infra text accompanying notes 93–100. 
 13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 14. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Knotts15 that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their movements on public roadways.16  Thus, people cannot raise 
Fourth Amendment complaints when their actions are open to the 
public, including law enforcement officers, even if these officers use 
hidden location-tracking devices or other technology to do so.17  
While people may create some measure of constitutionally protected 
privacy, even in public spaces, by closing their car doors or keeping 
documents and other items inside a briefcase, purse, or some other 
container,18 people cannot constitutionally shield the actions they 
leave visible or audible.  As one judge said in a recent Global 
Positioning System (GPS) tracking case:  “The practice of using . . . 
devices to monitor movements on public roads falls squarely within 
the Court’s consistent teaching that people do not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in that which they . . . leave open to view 
by others.”19 
Or so the Supreme Court and other courts insisted—until a year 
ago.  In the 2012 case of United States v. Jones,20 five Justices, in two 
separate concurring opinions, indicated that it is time for a doctrinal 
change.21  These five justices suggested that an important 
constitutional line is crossed—and the constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment are triggered—when public surveillance becomes too 
intense or prolonged.22  Justice Alito, for example, argued that, while 
“relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public 
streets” is generally free from Fourth Amendment restriction, “use of 
longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
                                                          
 15. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 16. Id. at 281. 
 17. See id. at 282. 
 18. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 598 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) 
(restating that all citizens have a clear privacy interest in the contents of personal 
articles). 
 19. United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., 
concurring), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012) (mem.). 
 20. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  In the case, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department came to suspect a nightclub owner, Antoine 
Jones, of drug trafficking and used multiple surveillance measures—including visual 
surveillance and wiretapping—to gather more information.  Id. at 948.  The 
government also obtained a warrant to attach a GPS device, within ten days of the 
warrant’s issuance, to Jones’s vehicle while it was in the District of Columbia, but the 
government attached the GPS after these ten days had elapsed and when Jones’s 
vehicle was in Maryland rather than the District.  Id. 
 21. See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (positing that the Supreme Court 
should consider revisiting some of the fundamental premises of Fourth Amendment 
law in light of technological developments); id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (illustrating that the majority’s reasoning was based on eighteenth 
century tort law). 
 22. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Alito that 
“longer term GPS monitoring” constitutes a search in most cases).  
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impinges on expectations of privacy” and should constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search.23 
The justices did not, however, clearly identify how long or how 
intense public surveillance must be to cross the constitutional 
dividing line.24  They did not have to do so because the majority 
opinion relied on a different rationale to require a warrant.  The 
majority emphasized that the installation of a GPS device on a car 
prior to tracking was a trespass.25  Because the Supreme Court did not 
hold that the tracking of public movements alone violated the Fourth 
Amendment, it did not need to specify the point at which public 
tracking may violate the Fourth Amendment.26  While this particular 
instance of public tracking began with a “trespassory” planting of a 
GPS device,27 other kinds of public surveillance—including most 
forms of video surveillance—do not.  The public street cameras that 
capture a car’s movements, or those that do so from a drone 
hovering overhead, do not require police to touch the car—let alone 
alter it—to surveil its movements.28  When the Justices confront a case 
like this, they may have to clearly delineate the constitutional 
boundary line between a search and non-search. 
This Article proposes a way to mark that line.  It does not do so by 
asking how long, or how intently, police focus on a particular person 
or event, but rather by suggesting a different criterion.  Whether 
public surveillance is a search should depend not on duration or the 
quantity of information gathered by a surveillance method, but 
rather on that method’s nature or design.29  More specifically, public 
                                                          
 23. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 24. Id. (noting that “[w]e need not identify with precision the point at which the 
tracking of this vehicle became a search,” and that while tracking Jones clearly 
qualified as a search, “[o]ther cases may present more difficult questions”). 
 25. Id. at 949 (majority opinion) (finding that by placing a GPS unit on Jones’s 
car, “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information,” which is a clear example of a Fourth Amendment search). 
 26. Id. at 954 (stating that while “[i]t may be that [tracking Jones’s movements] 
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy, . . . the present case does not require us to answer that question,” 
and that there was no need to resolve the “vexing problems” regarding how long 
tracking must be to constitute a search). 
 27. Id. at 949, 952–53 (finding that the government’s planting of the GPS on 
Jones’s car was a physical intrusion amounting to a trespass and that the “the Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the 
common-law trespassory test”). 
 28. Id. at 953–54 (highlighting that visual observation is constitutionally 
permissible). 
 29. I previously presented a somewhat different version of this proposal at the 
2012 Privacy Law Scholars Conference forum, “From Jones to Drones.”  See Marc 
Jonathan Blitz, United States v. Jones—and the Forms of Surveillance that May Be Left 
Unregulated in a Free Society, USVJONES BLOG (June 4, 2012), http://usvjones.com 
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surveillance should count as a search when it takes one of two forms.  
First, police engage in a Fourth Amendment search, even in public 
space, when they are not merely observing but also recording images 
or sounds of people.  Additionally, the police must obtain these 
images and sounds from events and people outside the recording 
officer’s presence.  In other words, the government does not conduct 
a search whenever an officer simply turns on an iPhone camera or a 
camcorder and then records what is happening in front of him.  
Rather, a public search occurs when recording technology allows 
officials to record events that they would otherwise not be able to see 
or hear.30  Second, a search can also occur in public when police 
magnify and observe details on a person, or the documents or other 
items she is carrying, so as to reveal information that would not 
otherwise have been apparent without a pat-down or some other stop-
and-search of a person’s papers or “effects.”31 
Such a technological form-based or design-based test,32 avoids the 
key difficulty that plagues an approach that tries, in Justice Alito’s 
words, to exempt “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s 
movements” from Fourth Amendment restriction, but places 
constitutional limits on “longer term GPS monitoring” or other 
surveillance in public.33  It spares the courts the task of seeking some 
elusive or arbitrary point in the duration or intensity of a search at 
which such monitoring morphs from being just another means by 
which police watch over public space into a possible violation of the 
Constitution.34  After police begin recording events outside of their 
                                                          
/2012/06/04/united-states-v-jones-and-the-forms-of-surveillance-that-may-be-left-
unregulated-in-a-free-society (“[W]hat is important is not the quantity or nature of 
information actually captured by surveillance, but rather the nature or form of the 
surveillance technique itself.”). 
 30. See infra notes 116–123 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 124–129 and accompanying text.  
 32. Other scholars have also proposed their own distinct versions of such a 
technological form-based or design-based test for what might count as a search in 
public.  See, e.g., David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Technology-Centered Approach 
to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 5, 25–41), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129439; Susan 
Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 50–
70 (setting forth a four-factor test for determining whether new surveillance methods 
constitute a search) [hereinafter Freiwald, First Principles]; Susan Freiwald, The Four 
Factor Test, USVJONES BLOG (June 4, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/06/04/the-
four-factor-test [hereinafter Freiwald, Four Factor Test] (questioning what the Fourth 
Amendment test for GPS tracking should be); see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing 
these approaches in more detail). 
 33. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
 34. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
311, 313, 325, 333–34 (2012) (analyzing the difficulties in applying the “mosaic 
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presence, it does not matter whether they do so for two minutes or 
two weeks.  Police engage in a search simply by using technology with 
the capacity to create a record of people’s movements and aiming it 
at certain individuals.  Defining searches in public spaces in this 
manner parallels the way that courts typically define Fourth 
Amendment searches in private spaces.  Police are immediately 
bound by the Fourth Amendment when they enter a person’s house, 
open up and flip through the pages of a diary, or tap a phone line.35  
These investigations do not become a search only after they have 
lasted a certain length of time; rather, the search begins with an entry 
or intrusion, even if the stay or investigation lasts only seconds or 
minutes.36  To be sure, the brevity of a search may, in some cases, 
make it more likely to count as a “reasonable” and permissible 
search.37  Nevertheless, brevity alone cannot transform such a search 
into a non-search that is entirely free from Fourth Amendment 
restriction.  The same should be true of public surveillance 
technologies that involve remote recording or magnification of 
details normally invisible without a physical search of a person, her 
documents, or the items she is carrying. 
Courts obtain a second advantage by focusing on the nature or 
design of the investigatory method:  The proposed test avoids 
transforming all police monitoring into a constitutional matter.  As 
Justice Harlan wrote in a 1971 dissent, there is a constitutionally 
significant difference between monitoring and recording.38  When 
the government audio records someone’s words, it does something 
                                                          
theory,” which is a Fourth Amendment approach under which investigatory actions 
that do not count as a search in isolation count as a search when aggregated). 
 35. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“[T]here is certainly 
no exception to the warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks open the 
front door and sees nothing but the non-intimate rug on the vestibule floor.”); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (stating that, except in exigent 
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant as soon as 
they cross the “line” that marks the entrance to the house). 
 36. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (stating that searches, no 
matter how brief, must be based on probable cause).  
 37. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968) (holding that police stop-
and-frisk searches, while entailing a search and seizure, require only “reasonable 
suspicion” and not a warrant or probable cause partly because they, unlike arrests, 
constitute “a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion”). 
 38. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 785–86 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that the plurality ignored the differences between third-party monitoring 
and recording); see also Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:  Camera Surveillance of 
Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 270 (2002) (taking note, but 
expressing doubt, that the Supreme Court would accept the argument that although 
“we assume the risk that others will view our public conduct, we do not assume the 
risk that our public actions will be reduced to a photograph or film”).  
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far more invasive than simply listening to them.39  It creates a record 
that not only is “free of the possibility of error and oversight that 
inheres in human reporting,” but also allows officials to review a 
person’s life in far more detail than they could if they relied only on 
the fading memories of listeners.40 
The lesson of Harlan’s contrast is not that recording requires 
constitutional oversight simply because it reduces our privacy to a 
greater extent than mere listening or watching.  Rather, it is that 
recording changes the nature of police surveillance in such a way that 
it threatens privacy as well as other Fourth Amendment interests 
more deeply.  Consider video recording.  Such recording does not 
necessarily reduce an individual’s privacy at the time it occurs:  if no 
one watches the video footage, as it is recorded or afterwards, then 
the actions captured in the tape remain just as private as they would 
be had no one seen or captured them.41  If an officer does watch the 
scenes captured by the cameras, then an individual’s privacy is 
compromised to some extent—but the fact that recording is 
occurring does not make that officer’s live observation any more 
intrusive than it would otherwise be. 
Even unmanned recording, however, raises a significant threat to 
Fourth Amendment purposes.  It takes ephemeral occurrences in our 
lives and transforms them into permanent records.  Through 
recording technology of this sort, the government can scan its 
collection of footage of any person’s minute-to-minute activities in 
hopes of finding something incriminating.  Recording, in other 
words, potentially allows the government to trawl through digital 
images and audio records in search of evidence that justifies 
subjecting individuals to state power.  Such probing is precisely the 
kind of dragnet-style investigation that the Fourth Amendment is 
supposed to restrict42—and does restrict at roadblocks and airports.  
                                                          
 39. Cf. White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (elaborating that third-
party bugging “undermine[s] th[e] confidence and sense of security in dealing 
with one another that is characteristic of individual relationships between 
citizens in a free society”). 
 40. See id. at 787–89 (indicating that allowing government officials to monitor 
private conversations through a willing third-party assistant would compromise the 
unhindered discourse “that liberates daily life”). 
 41. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:  Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 1418 (2001) (“Being observed by an insect 
on the wall is not invasive for privacy; rather, privacy is threatened by being 
subject to human observation, which involves judgments that can affect one’s life 
and reputation.”). 
 42. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 327 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (stating that “dragnet techniques” are at the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on invasive searches). 
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At such checkpoints, police have limited authority to make 
suspicionless stops (and searches) to assure safety in these 
transportation channels.  What they may not do under the Fourth 
Amendment is search for other evidence of crime that such a 
chokepoint is able to strain out.43  But a dragnet that catches 
thousands of travelers or other citizens is not the only kind of 
sweeping investigatory technique that offends Fourth Amendment 
purposes.  For example, dragnet investigations under which officers 
rummage through possessions or drawers of documents without 
justification also offend these purposes, even when the hunt for 
unknown contraband occurs within a single home and focuses on the 
property of a single homeowner.44  A government “fishing 
expedition” should likewise be deemed to be subject to Fourth 
Amendment constraints when the data that officials sift through 
comes not from personal documents, but from the trail of data 
people leave behind in a world in which every action or movement is 
recorded for potential review at a later date.45 
To be sure, public surveillance can threaten Fourth Amendment 
purposes, even when police are not recording what they see.  Police 
can use telescopes or extremely powerful zoom lenses to scrutinize 
details on a person’s clothing, or on items or documents removed 
from a wallet or briefcase, that would be invisible even to bystanders 
just a few yards away.46  Certain courts have suggested that such 
telescopic magnification would constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search when pointed at the windows of a home,47 and if that is true, it 
is certainly possible that telescope-aided scrutiny should also be a 
                                                          
 43. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–42 (2000) (striking 
down as unconstitutional a road block program under which police investigated each 
car not only for drunk drivers but also for evidence of drug-related contraband); 
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 805 (2d Cir. 1974) (expressing concern 
about “the possibility that the purpose of the airport search [to prevent terrorism] 
may degenerate from the original search for weapons to a general search for 
contraband”); see also infra notes 162–167 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (recognizing that the 
Fourth Amendment forbids “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s 
belongings” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971))). 
 45. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public 
Space:  Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 1349, 1407 (2004) (analogizing “mass video surveillance of law-abiding 
citizens” to “unrestricted house-to-house searches” that the Fourth Amendment 
clearly prohibits). 
 46. See id. at 1377.  
 47. See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The 
vice of telescopic viewing into the interior of a home is that it risks observation not 
only of what the householder should realize might be seen by unenhanced viewing, 
but also of intimate details of a person’s private life, which he legitimately expects 
will not be observed either by naked eye or enhanced vision.”). 
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search when it is aimed at the other subjects of Fourth Amendment 
protection—namely, an individual’s “person, . . . papers, and 
effects.”48  High magnification of a detail on a person or her property 
may thus, like recording, bring police observation in public onto 
Fourth Amendment territory. 
That such public surveillance is a Fourth Amendment search does 
not mean that it will always be a Fourth Amendment violation.  A 
search of a house, person, paper, or effect is prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment only when it is “unreasonable.”49  Just as police, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, and other law enforcement 
officials frequently use wiretaps by obtaining a warrant or absent such 
a warrant when circumstances make a wiretap reasonable,50 police 
should be able to capture and examine video records or to closely 
magnify details of public action when use of these methods count 
as reasonable. 
Part I of this Article discusses why courts have found the Fourth 
Amendment analysis of public surveillance to be so challenging and 
describes how they have thus far met this challenge.  Part II offers a 
new test for determining when public surveillance constitutes a 
search:  the government’s actions require Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny when it records remote events or uses an analogous method 
of investigation, or, in certain instances, when it employs 
magnification or sound amplification in a public space.  Other kinds 
of police surveillance in public generally are not searches, even if 
they employ sophisticated technology.  Part III explains why this 
approach is preferable to various alternatives that scholars, and 
judges themselves, have considered as they have struggled with how 
Fourth Amendment law should apply in public.  In the course of 
doing so, Part III describes why police officers will be able to use 
video surveillance technology, even without a warrant, so long as the 
police meet Fourth Amendment reasonableness standards that assure 
the technology is not used in a way that unnecessarily diminishes 
individuals’ freedom from state monitoring. 
                                                          
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 49. See id.; Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990). 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. 11-6493, 2013 WL 1759941, at *5–6 
(6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2013) (affirming the district court’s ruling that a wiretap was 
permissible because the government proved it was necessary, and the affidavit in 
support of the intercept order was based on sufficiently reliable evidence). 
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I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE SUPREME COURT’S INITIAL 
STEPS TOWARD A SOLUTION 
A. The Problem of Public Surveillance 
Whether public video surveillance is a search may seem deceptively 
simple.  Since 1967, the Supreme Court has adopted the rule from 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, under which the government 
engages in a Fourth Amendment search any time it intrudes upon an 
“expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”51  Members of a free society do not expect to be subject 
to continuous government surveillance, even as they walk or drive on 
public pathways.  As a result, this kind of surveillance should be 
subject to constitutional limits.  Not only do many Americans share 
this expectation,52 but they also likely view it as reasonable and 
justified, as was clear in the legislative reaction to law enforcement 
officials’ increasing use of drones.  The Florida legislature, for 
instance, recently enacted a law tightly restricting the use of drone 
surveillance within the State’s borders:  the Freedom from Unwanted 
Surveillance Act.53  Additionally, some U.S. Senators and 
Congressmen have suggested that federal restrictions might also be 
justified because, as Senator Chuck Grassley explained, “[t]he 
thought of government drones buzzing overhead, monitoring the 
activity of law abiding citizens, runs contrary to the notion of what it 
means to live in a free society.”54 
But the task of fitting public surveillance into Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is, for a number or reasons, more challenging than 
simply taking note of these intuitions.  First, there is the line-drawing 
problem that confronted the concurrence-writers in Jones.55  While it 
                                                          
 51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 52. See Jim Gold, Poll:  Americans OK with Some Domestic Drones—But Not To Catch 
Speeders, NBC NEWS (June 13, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news 
/2012/06/13/12205763-poll-americans-ok-with-some-domestic-drones-but-not-to-
catch-speeders?lite (describing polls indicating that Americans support drone use for 
certain security operations, such as securing the border or for “search and rescue” 
operations, but that 67% oppose the use of drones to issue speeding tickets, and 64% 
describe themselves as “somewhat concerned” or “very concerned” about drones’ 
effect on their privacy). 
 53. See Joe Sutton & Catherine E. Shoichot, Florida Gov. Rick Scott Signs Law 
Restricting Drones, CNN (Apr. 28, 2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/25 
/us/florida-drone-law/index.html (describing Florida’s Freedom from Unwanted 
Surveillance Act, which restricts the use of police drones within Florida’s borders). 
 54. Brendan Sasso, Senators Fear Drones “Buzzing Overhead,” HILL (Mar. 20, 2013, 
3:06 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/289337-senators-
worry-about-domestic-drone-surveillance. 
 55. See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text (detailing that the 
concurrences identified the problem but not a solution). 
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may seem clear that the continuous, suspicionless video recording by 
hidden government cameras is at odds with a free society, this is not 
necessarily true of all cases in which police officers watch a person 
they deem suspicious,56 tail a car for a period of time,57 or observe a 
person with low-powered binoculars.58  How then, are we to 
distinguish between permissible, garden-variety watching, and 
intensive surveillance that offends constitutional principles? 
Such problems in drawing Fourth Amendment boundary lines 
have recently haunted the efforts of courts to resolve the question of 
whether (and how) the Fourth Amendment applies to police use of 
GPS surveillance.  As noted above, the Supreme Court concurrences 
in Jones found that location tracking is a search only if it lasts a 
sufficient amount of time, but did not specify how long is too long.59  
In the lower court opinion in Jones, when the case was known as 
United States v. Maynard,60 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit tried to provide an answer to this question by comparing GPS 
tracking’s incremental intrusions into a person’s privacy to what 
happens when the government assembles pieces of a person’s history 
as though it were piecing together a jigsaw puzzle or “mosaic.”61  To 
demonstrate this point, the D.C. Circuit noted that while the fact that 
a person stops at a gynecologist office at one moment may itself tell 
an observer very little, when police piece this fact together with 
another GPS reading showing, for example, that she has also stopped 
at a baby supply store, they can construct a detailed picture of her 
daily routine and likely infer something about why she followed the 
path she did (she is pregnant).62  But this mosaic theory approach 
merely begs the questions it is intended to answer:  how detailed a 
picture is too detailed, and how many data points may police collect 
before they enter constitutional territory? 
                                                          
 56. See, e.g., Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam) (finding that a police officer did not conduct a search under the Fourth 
Amendment when he “followed [individuals] in his squad car as they drove on 
Boone County roads and sat outside businesses that [they] patronized”). 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f 
police follow a car around, or observe its route by means of cameras mounted on 
lampposts or of satellite imaging as in Google Earth, there is no search.”). 
 58. See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 is Not Like 1984:  A Broader Perspective on 
Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 531, 550 (2007) (“Presumably a law enforcement agent could use a 
flashlight or a set of binoculars without needing a warrant . . . .”). 
 59. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 60. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 
S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 61. See id. at 562. 
 62. Id. 
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Judges are unlikely to provide consistent answers to these 
questions.  This was evident in the case of United States v. Cuevas-
Perez,63 in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
attempted to apply the D.C. Circuit’s Fourth Amendment analysis 
without expressly endorsing it.64  The majority concluded that 
Maynard’s “mosaic” rule simply did not apply to the facts before it 
because the police had followed Cuevas-Perez for sixty hours, not 
for twenty-eight days as in Maynard, and had tracked his 
movements on a “single journey,” rather than on multiple trips.65  
The dissent, by contrast, pointed out that monitoring of the 
defendant on a “60-hour odyssey across 1,650 miles” is far from the 
kind of brief trip that might be too insignificant to require Fourth 
Amendment constraints.66 
The problem is that no apparent principle explicates whether, or 
why, sixty hours is short enough to remain free from Fourth 
Amendment restraints.  After all, if the danger raised by ongoing GPS 
surveillance is that it allows police to “connect the dots” of a person’s 
movements and draw inferences about her private plans, a sixty-hour 
period is probably sufficient time to draw such a connection and 
make inferences based on the data gathered.67  To take the D.C. 
Circuit’s own example from Maynard, a woman’s visit to a baby supply 
store may certainly come within sixty hours of her visit to a 
gynecologist; thus, observers will hardly need twenty-eight days, or 
even a week, to learn details about that woman’s life that are unlikely 
to be apparent to others in public space.  This uncertainty about how 
much police can learn in a day, or a week, also provides reason to 
question the Virginia Supreme Court’s conclusion that Maynard’s 
mosaic theory should not apply to GPS tracking that lasts less than a 
week.68  It is not clear that a week-long monitoring period is short 
enough to avoid the dangers of aggregated information that 
concerned the D.C. Circuit.69 
The Fourth Amendment line-drawing challenge courts face in 
public spaces is, in many ways, analogous to the one that Professor 
Orin Kerr recently addressed in proposing a Fourth Amendment 
                                                          
 63. 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012) (mem.). 
 64. See id. at 274. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 293 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 67. See id. at 292–93.  
 68. See Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 291 n.12 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding that there was no search or seizure when the police installed a GPS device 
on the defendant’s work van when it was parked in public and used the GPS to track 
the van while on public streets), aff’d, 732 S.E.2d 4 (Va. 2012). 
 69. See id. 
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regime for Internet communications.70  As Kerr pointed out, the key 
problem in determining whether Internet surveillance constitutes a 
search is that the natural marker that generally delineates what 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search in physical space—namely, 
the distinction between an enclosed, private space and an observable, 
public environment—does not exist on the Internet.71  “The 
distinction between government surveillance outside and government 
surveillance inside,” Kerr writes, “is probably the foundational 
distinction in Fourth Amendment law” because the government does 
not need any cause or order to conduct surveillance outside,” but 
“entering enclosed spaces ordinarily constitutes a search that triggers 
the Fourth Amendment.”72  However, the Internet does not fit nicely 
into this model because there is no outside/inside division to rely 
upon.  Everything on the Internet is considered to be enclosed and 
inside.73  Kerr therefore argued that Fourth Amendment law needs a 
new, functionally equivalent distinction to mark the boundary 
between searches and non-searches.74  He proposed that courts 
should rely on the distinction between content and non-content in e-
mails or other Internet communications.75  When investigators 
intercept and read the contents of a person’s e-mail, for example, 
they are conducting a Fourth Amendment search and must first 
obtain a warrant or otherwise show their search is reasonable.76  
Conversely, when investigators merely want to look at the address 
information on the e-mail, they are doing the equivalent of 
looking at the outside of an envelope, not the letter inside, and 
this monitoring of non-content information is therefore not a 
Fourth Amendment search.77 
If Internet surveillance raises a Fourth Amendment problem 
because everything is “inside,” public surveillance raises a similar 
problem because everything is outside.  Public surveillance is “public” 
because it focuses on the outside world and, more specifically, on 
visible behavior in it.  Here too, then, Fourth Amendment law needs 
                                                          
 70. See generally Kerr, supra note 11. 
 71. Id. at 1009–10. 
 72. Id. at 1010. 
 73. Id. at 1012. 
 74. See id. (“The inside/outside distinction no longer serves the basic function in 
the Internet setting that it serves in the physical world.”). 
 75. Id. at 1007–08. 
 76. Id. at 1020. 
 77. Id. at 1019; see also Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in 
Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2115–16 (2009) (proposing, based on case 
law, the existence of a content/non-content distinction between searches and non-
searches in Internet communications). 
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a replacement for the outside/inside distinction.  It needs a new 
boundary line to demarcate parts of the outside world that deserve to 
be treated like inside spaces for Fourth Amendment purposes—parts 
of our life in public that, like our living rooms and bedrooms, deserve 
to be constitutionally insulated from government scrutiny. 
The lack of a replacement for the outside-inside distinction in 
public space leaves judges without a key resource for determining 
what counts as a search in public space.  Without such a line, it is 
difficult for courts to pronounce long-lasting public surveillance to be 
a search on the basis that certain forms of it seem disturbingly 
intrusive.78  These intrusions do not, by themselves, tell us how to 
distinguish investigations that are invasive enough to require 
constitutional oversight from those that are not. 
There is a second difficulty in treating public surveillance as a 
search:  if courts subject police to significant constitutional limits in 
monitoring public space, they risk crippling law enforcement’s efforts 
to do what it is charged with doing.  Police are not only generally as 
free as other citizens to watch the streets they patrol, they are duty-
bound to do so.  So it seems counterintuitive to require police to 
obtain a warrant before showing the vigilance they are required to 
show as a condition of their work. 
One might suggest that courts should impose Fourth Amendment 
requirements only on focused investigations of public space and not 
on casual observations that police make while on patrol.  But even 
this approach arguably restricts police too tightly.  Because law 
enforcement is generally barred from conducting warrantless 
investigations of homes and other private spaces, it needs to begin an 
investigation somewhere else—in the public space outside of the 
home.  As the Supreme Court noted in California v. Ciraolo,79 in order 
to obtain the probable cause required to obtain a warrant, police 
must begin investigating and collecting evidence before they have 
probable cause.80  Thus, there needs to be some place to start.81  In 
short, if courts and scholars extend Fourth Amendment protection 
beyond homes, private drawers, and journals into the realm of public 
and visible activity, they have to recognize that they are extending it 
into a realm that is, in many ways, and to a far greater extent than the 
                                                          
 78. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing that rapidly advancing technology will continue to alter the method of 
Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 79. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 80. Id. at 213. 
 81. Id. (postulating that the chance to make observations from the public space is 
“precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant”). 
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activity in a home or other private environment, very much the 
government’s business. 
Effective investigation, moreover, often requires police to take 
advantage of new surveillance technologies.  As the Seventh Circuit 
noted in an earlier GPS case, the Fourth Amendment “cannot 
sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in the 
twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.”82 
B. A Simple, but Flawed, Position:  Treating Open Areas as a             
Fourth Amendment Free Zone 
One possible response to such concerns is to err, at least in public 
spaces, on the side of giving government all of the room it needs to 
conduct investigations.  In short, we might simply adopt the rule that 
surveillance of what is visible and public never constitutes a search.  
In applying the Fourth Amendment to public space, in other words, 
we might conclude that we do not need a substitute for the 
outside/inside distinction because that dichotomy itself provides a 
simple and satisfactory answer:  everything that is left visible and 
audible in the outside world is “outside” and therefore may be 
observed by the government free from constitutional restraint.83 
At least on the surface, this is the approach that the Supreme Court 
has taken to public investigations so far (or at least until its 2012 Jones 
decision).84  The Court has allowed the government to track the 
movements of automobiles with radio transmitters, for example, so 
long as the tracking occurs “on public thoroughfares” and does not 
extend inside the home.85  It has permitted officials to observe the 
property of a factory, and even the outskirts of private homes, from 
planes and helicopters in “public airspace” where the public has a 
right to be and observe what is around it.86  In fact, decades before 
                                                          
 82. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 83. For an argument largely favoring such a position, see Heidi Reamer 
Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity:  A Pragmatic Defense of No Privacy in Public, 7 
I/S:  J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2012). 
 84. See, e.g., Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (restating that what an individual knowingly 
exposes to the public is not protected by the Fourth Amendment).  
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (holding that 
investigatory actions do not constitute a search when they are observing that which 
can be seen by the public); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) 
(explaining that traveling over public streets voluntarily conveys information to 
anyone who might be watching with the naked eye or with the assistance of 
technology). 
 86. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212–13 (holding that investigators do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment when they observe property from public airspace and members 
of the general public flying overhead could make the same observation); Dow Chem. 
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (finding that the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s fly-by assessment of an industrial complex to observe whether it 
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radio transmitters and chartered planes became a common feature of 
everyday life, the Supreme Court—in a 1924 decision written by 
Justice Holmes—made clear that “the special protection accorded by 
the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, 
papers and effects’ is not extended to the open fields.”87  The “open 
fields” doctrine later seemed to some to be at odds with the Court’s 
holding in Katz, in which the majority held that electronic 
eavesdropping is a Fourth Amendment search even when it targets 
someone making a call from a public phone booth on a street.88  The 
Katz majority had called into question the notion that everything we 
do in public may be monitored free of constitutional restraint, 
declaring that what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”89 
But the Supreme Court later made clear that the open fields 
doctrine remains a central part of the Fourth Amendment law.  In 
Oliver v. United States,90 the Court squarely rejected a property owner’s 
claim that the police had violated the Fourth Amendment when they 
located a marijuana field on his land.91  Unlike a realm where 
individuals might reasonably expect privacy, said the Court, “open 
fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the 
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or 
surveillance.”92  Courts have understood this “open fields” doctrine to 
mean that police are free to observe not only what is visible in a field, 
but also what they can see in public streets and roads.93 
Such an approach still leaves individuals with an opportunity to 
find sanctuaries for privacy in public space, but only when they find 
pockets of “inside” space somewhere in the public, visible world.  
People might, for example, hide items they bring onto a street within 
a purse or briefcase.  They might keep confidential conversations 
secret by engaging in them only from a closed phone booth94 or from 
                                                          
was in compliance with environmental regulations did not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search). 
 87. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
 88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also, Bruce G. Berner, The 
Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 383, 390 (1991) 
(recalling that many commentators predicted that Hester’s open-field doctrine would 
no longer be applicable after Katz). 
 89. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 90. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 91. See id. at 173, 182–84. 
 92. Id. at 179. 
 93. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986). 
 94. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (finding the government engaged in a search 
when its eavesdropping invaded “the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably 
relied while using the telephone booth”). 
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behind the locked doors and closed windows of an automobile.95  It 
was this kind of privacy in public that the Supreme Court endorsed 
and protected in Delaware v. Prouse96 when it emphasized that “people 
are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step 
from their homes onto the public sidewalks” or when “they step from 
the sidewalks into their automobiles.”97  Even on public streets, 
drivers remain protected from having their cars arbitrarily stopped 
and searched,98 and pedestrians are protected from being stopped 
and frisked for weapons unless an officer has “reasonable” suspicion 
that they are involved in criminal activity.99  But these types of Fourth 
Amendment protections only shield what is inside of one’s car or 
inside of one’s pockets.  They do not limit a police officer’s freedom 
to observe the outside of the car or its movements, or to scrutinize 
the outside of a person’s jacket.100 
There are a number of advantages to this bright-line rule that 
denies Fourth Amendment protections to observations that are 
visible to the public.  One is that it keeps Fourth Amendment law 
consistent with the classic principle of search and seizure law, 
enunciated in the 1765 case of Entick v. Carrington,101 that “the eye 
cannot . . . be guilty of a trespass.”102  While this English case 
antedated the enactment of the U.S. Bill of Rights in 1791, it was 
familiar to the Framers and was an important inspiration, and source 
for, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.103  Its assumption that 
officials do not commit an unreasonable search simply by looking at 
what they can see has become a key principle in that jurisprudence.104  
                                                          
 95. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658–59, 663 (1979) (holding that 
stopping an automobile and requesting the driver’s license and registration involves 
a search and is only permissible under the Fourth Amendment where there is 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to do so). 
 96. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 97. Id. at 663. 
 98. See id. (requiring that officers may only stop and detain motorists if “there is 
at least articulable and reasonable suspicion” that the motorist has violated the law). 
 99. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 24–25 (1968) (highlighting the need to 
grant officers a means of determining whether a person poses a threat of physical 
harm and a way to neutralize that risk). 
 100. See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (“This Court has 
to date not deviated from the understanding that mere visual observation does not 
constitute a search.”). 
 101. 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765). 
 102. Id., in 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765). 
 103. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–27 (1886) (explaining that, 
during the Revolutionary Period, American statesman were familiar with Entick, the 
“monument of English freedom,” and its propositions were unquestionably in the 
minds of the Framers as they created the Fourth Amendment). 
 104. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986) (holding that 
police do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they observe what is visible to 
the public). 
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As Justice Scalia noted in Jones, “This Court has to date not deviated 
from the understanding that mere visual observation does not 
constitute a search.”105 
When police search inside of a home or another private 
environment, of course, they engage in more than mere observation.  
They first enter the space, thereby transforming their subsequent 
observations into a search requiring a warrant (or some other 
showing of constitutional reasonableness).106  By contrast, in public 
spaces, police can often observe an individual’s movements and other 
activities without having to set foot on anyone else’s property.107  To 
the extent they invade the privacy of the person they watch, they 
often do so simply through observing. 
A second advantage of denying Fourth Amendment protections to 
observations of what is visible in public is its simplicity and clarity.  It 
draws a clear line for police officers and citizens.  What is inside a 
home or office is protected; what is outside in public space is not.  To 
be sure, this kind of simple division does not line up perfectly with 
individuals’ expectations of privacy.  Individuals may well be more 
eager to hide certain activities they conduct in public life, such as 
travelling to a psychotherapist’s office or visiting an X-rated movie 
theater, than they are to hide many mundane activities in their home 
life, such as their choice of what to have for breakfast.  But perhaps it 
is not plausible to calibrate Fourth Amendment protections to the 
privacy that individuals expect in each discrete activity. 
The Supreme Court has certainly not tried to adjust the degree of 
protection on an activity-by-activity basis in applying the Fourth 
Amendment to in-home activity.  On the contrary, as the Court 
emphasized in Kyllo v. United States,108 “[i]n the home, . . . all details 
are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying 
government eyes.”109  It therefore does not matter that the activities 
the government observes in gathering information from a home are 
not particularly embarrassing or sensitive. 
The Fourth Amendment errs on the side of protecting the privacy 
of all in-home activity; perhaps it should err in the other direction 
outside the home.  If the public needs some protected space where it 
can count on privacy without worrying about whether a particular 
activity is or is not sufficiently intimate to be shielded, government 
                                                          
 105. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. 
 106. See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 107. See id. at 949–50 (majority opinion). 
 108. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 109. Id. at 37 (holding that the use of thermal imagers to detect the heat 
emissions coming from a house is a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
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officials might also need some space where they can watch potentially 
illegal activities without worrying, during each observation, whether 
the activity they are watching is too private to look at (for too long) 
without a warrant.110  Such a bright-line rule arguably would not only 
provide certainty for police, but also reassure the population that 
relies on them that law enforcement will be able to act proactively 
and effectively to investigate and thwart criminal activity. 
It is perhaps therefore not surprising that while the D.C. Circuit in 
Maynard ventured to extend Fourth Amendment limits to public 
surveillance,111 the other circuits to address the issue have found that 
GPS tracking is a non-search by virtue of the fact that the information 
it collects comes solely from a driver’s public and observable 
activity.112  The Seventh Circuit, for example, noted in 2007 that while 
GPS surveillance may threaten our privacy, it does not do so in a way 
that makes it a Fourth Amendment search.113  Rather, it is a high-tech 
analogue for visual tracking of a kind police have long done free 
from constitutional restriction.114  “[I]f police follow a car around, or 
observe its route by means of cameras mounted on lampposts or of 
satellite imaging as in Google Earth, there is no search,” and when 
police “follow” the same car with GPS tracking technology, they are 
“on the same side” of this constitutional “divide.”115  The Seventh 
Circuit reaffirmed this position on GPS tracking after Maynard was 
decided, noting again that so long as GPS tracking is limited to public 
space, it reveals no more than what is already visible.116  The Eighth 
                                                          
 110. Arguably, this clear division of inside “protected areas” and outside 
unprotected ones is at odds with the Court’s oft-repeated language in Katz that 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment protects people not places,” and the key question is 
therefore not about where a person is, but what that person reasonably expects will 
remain private from the government.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350, 351–
52 (1967) (holding that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office,” is unprotected, and “what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public,” is constitutionally shielded).  But the 
inconsistency may be only superficial.  If we preserve privacy in public by enclosing 
our property or action inside of a hidden space, and we expose our action in the 
home by leaving it visible to people on the street, then Katz still tracks the 
outside/inside distinction quite well.  We lose our privacy inside the home when we 
leave an in-home action visible to those in the outside world, and we can gain a 
measure of privacy in public by finding a way to shroud it inside some kind of 
enclosed container or other space. 
 111. Maynard v. United States, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub 
nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. 
Ct. 1533 (2012) (mem.); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 113. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 997. 
 116. Id. at 997–98. 
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and Ninth Circuits likewise applied Supreme Court precedent to 
conclude that police no more engage in a Fourth Amendment search 
when they track a car in public space using GPS technology than 
when they track a car by following it.117  Video surveillance would, for 
example, not only show that a particular car parked near a doctor’s 
office, but also that a particular person emerged from the car, went 
inside the office, and perhaps came out carrying a worried look on 
her face.  It would indicate not only that a person parked near a 
particular bookstore or DVD store, but also, perhaps, what book or 
movie she carried out of the store.118  These activities, of course, take 
place in public where a person might be seen by others nearby, 
including police officers.  But in a world without ubiquitous public 
surveillance, others are unlikely to focus on, let alone remember, 
activities of strangers that have no significance to them.  A video 
archive, by contrast, gives interested officials a way to scrutinize (and 
review) such acts after the fact, even if they have no probable cause or 
other reasonable basis to track them.119  In short, if public and visible 
space remains a Fourth Amendment-free zone, it provides room not 
only for police to vigilantly watch the streets (as we expect them to 
do), or perhaps notice and scrutinize activities that seem suspicious, 
it also provides them with unlimited space to record, track, and 
review the minute-by-minute activities of individuals they have no 
reason to suspect of a crime.  This includes activities that, although 
occurring in public, deal with medical issues, reading preferences, or 
other traditionally private information.120 
                                                          
 117. See, e.g., Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609–10 (stating that no search occurs when the 
use of GPS technology does not infringe upon a person’s privacy); Pineda-Moreno, 591 
F.3d at 1216 (explaining that GPS technology serves as a substitute for physically 
following a car on public roads and therefore similarly does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search). 
 118. See generally Adam Schwartz, Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras:  A Pervasive 
and Poorly Regulated Threat to Our Privacy, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 47, 23 
(2013) (“Without proper regulation, each of us must wonder whether the 
government is watching and recording us when we walk into a book store, a political 
meeting, or a psychiatrist’s office.”). 
 119. See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1356 (describing how a video archive can allow the 
government to virtually “randomly stop and closely scrutinize numerous people,” 
exactly the type of searches the Fourth Amendment prevents). 
 120. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (listing examples of 
public movements that could reveal private details (citing People v. Weaver, 909 
N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009))). 
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C. The Supreme Court’s Signals About Fourth Amendment               
Protection in Public Spaces 
Perhaps because it was aware that there is sometimes a need for 
privacy protection in public, the Supreme Court, even before its 2012 
Jones decision, occasionally gave signals in dicta that it might carve out 
some exceptions to its bright-line rule that what is public and 
observable is not constitutionally protected from observation.121  It 
pointed specifically to two kinds of potential exceptions:  (1) 
circumstances in which magnification of what is visible from public 
airspace may reveal, not merely the contents of a field or greenhouse 
or the design and operation of a factory, but internal “intimate 
activity”;122 and (2) circumstances in which public surveillance is not 
simply targeted at a particular person for a discrete time period, but 
rather constitutes “dragnet” or “round-the-clock” tracking of a 
person’s activities.123 
Consider first some of the worries that the Court has raised about 
magnification.  In all three of the aerial surveillance cases that the 
Court has heard, it held that aerial surveillance of a home’s curtilage, 
or the property outside a factory, from a plane or helicopter did not 
count as a search subject to Fourth Amendment protection.124  
Instead, the Supreme Court stated that it might have been a protected 
search had high-powered magnification technology allowed 
government officials to observe not simply the property below, but 
intimate activity or perhaps personal property located on it that 
revealed elements of a person’s past or personality.125  In Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States,126 the Court held that Environmental 
Protection Agency officials did not trigger Fourth Amendment limits 
when they photographed details of a factory they suspected of 
pollution with a powerful map-making camera.127  But, as the Court 
emphasized in a footnote, this was not a case where the government’s 
                                                          
 121. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (noting 
that using satellite surveillance technology might require a warrant in order to be 
constitutional). 
 122. See infra notes 124–134 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court’s 
discussions of potential constitutional issues with magnification). 
 123. See infra notes 135–138 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court’s cases 
related to tracking devices). 
 124. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–50 (1989) (plurality opinion) (curtilage of 
a home); Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239 (industrial complex); California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (curtilage of a home). 
 125. See Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 238 (explaining that the magnification at issue 
in the case was not strong enough to expose “intimate details,” which would raise 
constitutional concerns).  
 126. 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
 127. Id. at 239. 
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magnification revealed small items such as a “class ring” or 
“identifiable human faces or secret documents captured in such a 
fashion as to implicate more serious privacy concerns.”128  Similarly, 
in Ciraolo, which was decided on the same day as Dow Chemical Co., the 
Court hinted at the same “intimate details” protection against public 
surveillance.129  It held that police did not violate reasonable 
expectations of privacy when they used a fly-over airplane to observe 
marijuana in the defendant’s backyard.130  But it also stressed that the 
State itself had acknowledged that some fly-over observation might 
well be a search when it employs “modern technology” to reveal 
“those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise 
imperceptible to police or fellow citizens.”131  And it included the 
same hint in Florida v. Riley,132 even as it refused to find the police 
engaged in a Fourth Amendment search when they hovered over the 
defendant’s greenhouse in a helicopter and peered through a crack 
in its roof to verify that it contained marijuana plants.133  The Court 
made clear that there was no evidence that the state’s aerial 
observation revealed any “intimate details connected with the use of 
the home or curtilage.”134  In short, where the state uses 
magnification to reveal intimate details in a home’s curtilage, it may 
well be engaged in a search—even if those details are visible from 
public airspace.  The same might be true of magnification that is 
aimed, not at a home’s curtilage, as in Ciraolo and Riley, or a 
business’s property, as in Dow Chemical Co., but at activities in streets, 
parks or open fields. 
The Supreme Court also suggested, even before the concurrences 
in Jones, that ongoing location tracking may reveal hidden details and 
thus become a search.  In its 1983 Knotts decision, the Court held that 
police do not engage in a search when they use a radio transmitter to 
track a driver’s movements on public roadways, while acknowledging 
that more invasive location tracking might be a protected search.135  
The Court noted the concern that finding the police conduct at issue 
                                                          
 128. Id. at 238 n.5. 
 129. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 & n.3 (noting that the use of technology to aid the 
naked eye might change Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 130. Id. at 215. 
 131. Id. at 215 n.3. 
 132. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 133. See id. at 450–51 (plurality opinion) (explaining why an expectation of 
privacy from the air was unreasonable). 
 134. Id. at 452. 
 135. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (discussing the Eighth 
Circuit’s finding that “intrusive” surveillance could be prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment but noting the limited invasiveness of the search used in this case). 
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in Knotts to be within constitutional limits would mean that police 
would likewise be free of all constitutional restraint if they conducted 
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen” on a whim.136  Such a 
“dragnet-type law enforcement practice[],” suggested the Supreme 
Court, might be subject to Fourth Amendment limits, even if limited 
location tracking with a radio transmitter is not.137  In Maynard, the 
D.C. Circuit seized upon this reasoning and held that a twenty-eight 
day period of continuous GPS surveillance was precisely the kind of 
ongoing surveillance that the Court in Knotts explained would be 
constitutionally problematic.138 
Taken by themselves, these dicta do not provide ready-to-apply 
Fourth Amendment rules for identifying searches in public spaces.  
First, they do not provide the kind of identifiable boundary line 
between searches and non-searches that law enforcement officers 
need in order to know whether a particular search technique 
requires a warrant.  As noted earlier, there is no guiding principle for 
when location tracking or video surveillance has occurred for too 
long of a period—or collected too much information—to remain 
free of constitutional limits.139  The same problem arises for a rule 
that constitutionally shields “intimate” activities from magnification 
technologies but leaves other types of activities, such as movements 
on a road, free-for-the-taking.  While certain activities, such as those 
involving family interactions, romantic relationships, or medical 
appointments, may intuitively be inappropriate for a state official to 
spy upon, the fact is that people are different.  What may be personal 
and private for one person may not be for another.  People are 
idiosyncratic, and what is truly private is a matter of social context.140  
For example, if a person is seeking a new job, he may want to buy 
books on switching careers or visit a resume workshop without his 
employer discovering these actions.  These kinds of activities may not 
be all that private for other people, such as a college student who, 
like many others about to graduate, has to prepare herself for the job 
market.  But, those actions may be private for a long-time employee 
who wants to, and perhaps must, hide his plans for a career-change 
from a current boss.  Courts are ill-equipped to make these 
distinctions.  Unlike a line that divides all content-based information 
                                                          
 136. See id. at 283–84 (deferring constitutional analysis of such practices). 
 137. Id. at 284. 
 138. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556–57 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 22–24.  
 140. See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1412 (giving examples of situational and individual 
factors that can influence the level of privacy desired). 
BLITZ.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2013  12:26 PM 
2013] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FUTURE 47 
in an e-mail from non-content based information, such as an e-mail 
address, a line that divides some kinds of “intimate” content from 
other kinds of content is a hard line for courts to mark. 
Still, the Supreme Court’s dicta about magnification and location 
provides a foundation to build upon.  The suggestion in its aerial 
surveillance cases—that some types of magnification would count as a 
search—captures a widely shared intuition; namely, that even in 
public space, we may desire, and should still be able, to keep certain 
details of our lives from being seen by others with whom we share 
that space.  Even in the outside world, certain details of our activity 
may be so difficult for others to notice that they are akin to details we 
have enclosed in a bag or a car.  These activities are essentially 
invisible because of their small size, the distance, or the limits of 
natural human vision and human attention. These factors can hide 
them almost as effectively as the invisibility created by a wall or 
enclosure that blocks light.  Details that cannot typically be seen 
without magnification, because of size, distance, or visual limitations, 
might constitute one category of outside information that should be 
treated as “inside” for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
The same is arguably true of information about us that can be 
obtained only by aggregating numerous public observations of our 
activity taken from a wide swathe of public space.  This is the 
argument at the heart of the mosaic theory that the D.C. Circuit used 
in Maynard to find that GPS surveillance was a search.141  The D.C. 
Circuit held: 
[T]he information the police discovered in this case—the totality 
of Jones’s movements over the course of a month—was not 
exposed to the public:  . . . unlike one’s movements during a single 
journey, the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month 
is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone 
will observe all those movements is effectively nil.142 
Just as magnification reveals information that is effectively invisible 
to observers in public space, so too did GPS surveillance in this case.  
This information therefore also might be deemed to be akin to 
“inside” information, which is generally not available to individuals 
who make only surface-level observations of the activity around them 
and do not deepen their observations with the aid of sophisticated 
technology or a large coordinated team of observers. 
                                                          
 141. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (discussing the government’s use of the mosaic 
theory to justify collecting information for national security purposes). 
 142. Id. at 558. 
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Yet, while the Supreme Court has been right to express concerns 
about certain kinds of magnification and about location tracking and 
right not to make every instance of magnification and location 
tracking a Fourth Amendment concern, it may have created future 
challenges by suggesting that the way to distinguish worrisome from 
unproblematic uses of these technologies requires courts to look at 
the amount or type of information gleaned.  As discussed in the next 
Part, courts can better build upon the Supreme Court’s concerns 
by focusing on the type or design of technology that the 
government uses to magnify details or record a person’s path 
through public space. 
II. ANOTHER SOLUTION:  RECORDING AND MAGNIFICATION SEARCHES 
A. Constitutionalizing Public Surveillance:  The Proposed Test 
This Part proposes another way to mark the line between searches 
and non-searches in public space.  The core element of this proposal 
is to treat all police recording of public movements and activities that 
occur outside the presence of the officer doing the recording as a 
Fourth Amendment search.  In short, the government engages in a 
search not merely when it watches a person, but when it systematically 
collects information about her by recording what she does.  In the 
absence of a recording, magnification of the items a person is 
carrying should likewise count as a “search” if the magnification 
reveals details about “persons, houses, papers, persons, [or] effects” 
that would only be discovered in a more traditional search.  This 
would require courts to be able to clearly identify situations where 
magnification has the same effect as traditional searches, such as a 
home entry, a pat down, or the unauthorized interception and review 
of mailed or e-mailed documents. 
This proposed test addresses the line-drawing problem because, 
under this approach, it does not matter how long police investigate a 
person’s public activities, but rather what technology they use to 
investigate the individual.  If the police use technology that can 
capture images or record video or locations of individuals outside the 
presence of the police officer doing the recording, then the 
investigation counts as a search from the moment the officer hits the 
“record” button.  Even if the recording lasts only a minute, it is a 
search.  After all, a wiretap or use of an electronic “bug” would count 
as a search from the moment it begins giving police access to the 
conversation on which they are eavesdropping.  The same would be 
true of recording-free tracking and magnification-aided investigations 
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described above.  Once courts assure themselves that police are using 
this advanced technology, any resulting investigation would be 
classified as a “search,” regardless of its duration or detail. 
Nor would such searches involve “mere visual surveillance.”  While 
the “eye cannot . . . be guilty of” Fourth Amendment violations,143 
electronic monitoring of otherwise inaccessible data can be 
unconstitutional.  Such electronic monitoring, for example, often 
counts as a “search” when it is used to intercept conversations.144  It 
should likewise count as a search when it is used to record 
individuals’ movements and activities in public space. 
Another reason to focus on the recording of remote activities as a 
trigger for Fourth Amendment protection is based on the fact that 
courts and scholars alike often identify the central purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment as protecting privacy.  For example, Professor 
Sherry Colb, a Fourth Amendment expert, made this claim in 
responding to the notion that the Fourth Amendment only protects 
privacy in a limited way—by protecting the privacy we receive from 
control we exercise over our homes, cars, or other property.145  The 
Framers’ goal in the Fourth Amendment, she wrote, can be best 
understood as protecting “privacy in all of its incarnations.”146  Such 
an emphasis on privacy is understandable given the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment since 1967.  Under the 
definition of “search” the Court has used since Katz, Fourth 
Amendment protections are triggered only when government invades 
“a reasonable expectation of privacy.”147  As a result, judges and 
commentators often have understandably assumed that it is precisely 
such an expectation of privacy, whether tightly linked to property or 
                                                          
 143. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)). 
 144. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[B]road 
and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which 
electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment 
safeguards.” (footnote omitted)). 
 145. See generally Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy:  Why Property Does Not 
Define the Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
889, 895–96 (2004) (discussing the privacy issues related to a hypothetical 
mindreading device). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Our later cases have 
applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz], which said that a 
violation occurs when government officers violate a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 
(describing multiple Supreme Court cases applying the test from “Justice 
Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence,” under which “a Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that 
society recognizes as reasonable”).  
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not, that the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect.148  Thus, 
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones focused on understanding 
whether the GPS tracking in that case intrudes upon a 
“constitutionally protected sphere of privacy.”149  Even critics of the 
Katz test, such as Professor Anthony Amsterdam, have spoken in 
similar terms about Fourth Amendment purposes, arguing that its 
core function is to prevent government attacks on privacy and 
freedom that would be “inconsistent with the aims of a free and 
open society.”150 
But as the Katz majority itself observed, “privacy” is too general a 
description of what the Fourth Amendment protects.151  “The Fourth 
Amendment,” it observed, “cannot be translated into a general 
constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”152  Rather, it protects privacy against 
“certain kinds of governmental intrusion.”153  The challenge facing 
courts then is to pinpoint which types of governmental invasions into 
privacy implicate Fourth Amendment purposes and which do not.  
This is an important question for courts to ask as they analyze public 
surveillance.  After all, every time a police officer stares at a person 
who is standing on the street or driving on the road, that officer is, in 
some small measure, lessening that person’s privacy vis-à-vis the state.  
He is watching activity that might otherwise go unnoticed by any 
representative of the state.  The same is true if an officer at a police 
center watches a monitor displaying images from a remote street 
camera.  These are invasions of privacy, but that alone does not make 
them violations of the Fourth Amendment.  Rather, courts must also 
assess whether the state’s reduction in our privacy in these cases is 
accomplished by the “kinds of governmental intrusion” that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits.154 
Unfortunately, the test that courts rely on most heavily to address 
this challenge—the reasonable expectations of privacy test—sounds 
precisely like a test for implementing the general right of privacy that 
                                                          
 148. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555–65 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(exploring whether the use of a GPS device violated the defendant’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
 149. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 150. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 403 (1974). 
 151. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (explaining that while the Fourth Amendment 
protects privacy, “its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with 
privacy”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 350 & n.4. (emphasis added) (discussing seizures of person and 
property as also being protected by the Fourth Amendment whether they occur in 
public or in private).  
 154. See id. at 350. 
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the Katz majority had sought to distinguish from the Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches.  Rather than limit 
Fourth Amendment safeguards to certain government intrusions into 
privacy, that test subjects all such intrusions that interfere with the 
privacy that individuals reasonably rely upon to constitutional limits. 
Judges have sometimes emphasized that the requirement for 
reasonable reliance is itself a limit.155  Even if a person expects privacy 
on a public street (satisfying the first prong of the reasonable 
expectations test), such an expectation is not one society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable (failing the second prong).156  But this 
limit is not all that helpful.  First, the privacy we reasonably rely upon 
can be easily diminished, as Professor Amsterdam has highlighted, 
and the Supreme Court soon after acknowledged, by government 
action itself.157  By putting people on notice that they will be subject 
to GPS monitoring, for example, the government could make it 
unreasonable to expect freedom from such monitoring.  Moreover, 
the test also seems to place Fourth Amendment law on quickly 
shifting sands.  An expectation of privacy can change quite rapidly as 
technology advances, and social norms change from year to year.158  
Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Court has often interpreted 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in a way that seems at odds with 
common intuitions about when citizens can expect privacy and, as 
Professors Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher have 
shown, with empirical data about such expectations.159 
Still, there is reason to take seriously—and try to better elaborate 
upon—the Supreme Court’s statement in Katz that the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches is narrower 
than a general “right of privacy.”  As the legal scholar William Stuntz 
                                                          
 155. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(focusing on the fact that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
from ground-level observation, but not from aerial observation). 
 156. Cf. id. at 452, 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the plurality 
erred by focusing on the helicopter being in legal airspace, when the real test was 
whether the helicopter was in airspace used “with sufficient regularity” that its 
presence would be reasonable to society). 
 157. See Amsterdam, supra note 150, at 384. 
 158. See Richard Sobel et al., The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones:  
Reinstating Justifiable Reliance as a More Secure Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 23–24 (2013) (noting the difficulty for an expectation-based test 
raised by the fact that “[e]xpectations of privacy may differ from person to person 
and from day to day”). 
 159. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases:  An Empirical Look at “Understandings 
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737–42, 774 (1993) (reporting 
findings about expectations of privacy indicating that “the Supreme Court’s 
conclusions about the scope of the Fourth Amendment are often not in tune with 
commonly held attitudes about police investigative techniques”). 
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powerfully argued, it would be odd to see the Fourth Amendment as 
providing such a right against government collection of our 
information through surveillance, when the modern regulatory state 
permits (indeed, even requires) collection of much of the same 
information in so many other ways.160  Stuntz noted that “much of 
what the modern state does outside of ordinary criminal investigation 
intrudes on privacy just as much as the kinds of police conduct that 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment law forbid.”161 
While the focus of this Article is not on the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment, it is useful to at least propose one alternative way of 
identifying the subset of privacy violations that also constitute 
possible Fourth Amendment violations.  The best way to identify such 
governmental intrusion is to begin with the paradigmatic type of 
invasion that the Fourth Amendment protects us from:  the police 
“fishing expedition.”  This is a kind of investigation that sifts through 
our property with the aim of finding some contraband, evidence of 
crime, or other findings that would justify subjecting us to state 
coercion.  We find this type of invasion, for example, in the home 
search where officials rummage through drawers and papers looking 
for evidence of crime.  We find it also in certain airport or road-block 
search practices, found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and 
other appellate courts,162 where police stop every traveler or car to see 
if they happen to find evidence of drug possession.  As Judge Kozinski 
stated in a decision holding such a practice unconstitutional when 
used at an airport security gate, an airport checkpoint is a tempting 
place for officers to look for evidence of all contraband, even 
contraband unrelated to air travel.163  Such a checkpoint is “a sieve 
through which pass the contents of billions of satchels, purses, 
briefcases and pockets [which] will naturally strain out much that is 
of interest to law enforcement.”164  But, while tempting, use of such a 
checkpoint in this way is unconstitutional.165  It imposes upon 
individuals the kind of dragnet search that the Fourth Amendment is 
                                                          
 160. William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1995). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 48 (2000) (stating 
that the Supreme Court has never found constitutional a roadblock whose primary 
purpose was finding evidence of criminal activity). 
 163. See United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1247–48 (9th Cir. 
1989) (holding that a generalized search of passengers’ baggage violated Fourth 
Amendment principles). 
 164. Id. at 1246. 
 165. See id. at 1247–48 (finding that the search was not constitutional under the 
concepts of an administrative search, a Terry stop, consent, exigent circumstances, 
inventory searches, or border searches). 
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designed to bar, allowing law enforcement to treat individuals they 
have no reason to suspect of a crime as potential criminals who, as 
such, must reveal all of their possessions and papers, as well as their 
persons, for thorough examination.  Airport checkpoints can and 
are, of course, permissibly used to conduct certain kinds of 
suspicionless searches—namely, searches of every air traveler for 
weapons or items that might be used for terrorism.166  However, such 
searches are subject to tight constitutional limits.167 
The constitutionality of types of observations by officials can be 
defined by this kind of paradigmatic analysis.  After all, it is not the 
case that every state intrusion into an individual’s privacy, even 
privacy that we reasonably rely upon, necessarily subjects us to the 
functional equivalent of the general search or dragnet investigation 
that was the focus of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.  Rather, 
what constitutes a general search is not only that it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy, but that it does so in a way that alters an 
individual’s relationship with the state.  It converts that individual 
into a suspected criminal. 
This is a concern that is, to some extent, at the core of the key 
alternatives to a privacy-based account of Fourth Amendment 
purpose.  The Fourth Amendment’s purpose is not simply to preserve 
a certain amount of privacy; it is rather to assure that individual 
citizens are ordinarily able to keep a certain amount of distance 
between themselves and the coercive machinery of state power—and 
live with a certain level of freedom from that power—and freedom 
from fear of being subjected to it on an official’s whim.  Professor 
William Stuntz, for example, argued that the central evil that Fourth 
Amendment law was designed to combat was not police observation, 
but police coercion.168  “[P]rivacy protection,” Stuntz wrote, “has little 
to do with the worst aspects of police misconduct,” which are about 
violence towards, or intimidation of, suspects.169  Using a vehicle 
search as an illustration, Stuntz argued that when police stop a driver 
and ask for consent to search the car for drugs, the most worrisome 
consequence of such a stop for an innocent person subject to the 
                                                          
 166. See United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1974) (describing 
the purpose behind airport searches). 
 167. See $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d at 1247–48 (explaining that airport 
security searches cannot be used to search for contraband generally or things that 
“merely look suspicious”). 
 168. See Stuntz, supra note 160, at 1020 (arguing that criminal procedure law’s 
focus on information gathering over police coercion comes at the expense of 
protecting values). 
 169. Id. at 1078. 
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search is not that the police will see or examine whatever happens to 
be in the car; it is “the indignity of being publicly singled out as a 
criminal suspect and the fear that flows from being targeted by 
uniformed, armed police officers.”170  In a similar vein, Professor Jed 
Rubenfeld has reasoned, based in large part on the Fourth 
Amendment’s text, that the Amendment’s central purpose was not to 
assure privacy but security—to protect people from “stifling 
apprehension and oppression that people would justifiably 
experience if forced to live their personal lives in fear of appearing 
‘suspicious’ in the eyes of the state.”171  Another scholar, Scott 
Sundby, likewise offered an alternative to the conventional privacy-
based account.  He stated that the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment “is founded upon the idea that integral to the 
Constitution and our societal view of government is a reciprocal trust 
between the government and its citizens.”172  Police, he argued, 
should not be permitted in our constitutional system to act in ways 
that treat each citizen as a potential criminal.173  For example, police 
should not be permitted to search for contraband in the trash cans of 
individuals they have no reason to suspect of criminal wrongdoing.174 
While the exact implications of these non-privacy-based approaches 
to the Fourth Amendment depend on how they are elaborated, it 
seems likely that each would justify putting some limits on when and 
how closely police can track or scrutinize individuals’ activities in a 
public space.  A society where the state tracks a person’s every move, 
even when it has no good reason to believe he is a criminal, is 
arguably not showing the kind of trust in its citizenry that Sundby 
insisted the Fourth Amendment demands.175  Nor is it likely to leave 
people feeling secure that, if they obey the law, the government will 
leave them free from its coercive grasp.  A person who feels that the 
government is always watching for any hint of a legal misstep is likely 
to feel that a police interrogation and arrest is always a possibility.  So 
Stuntz might find that unconstrained drone tracking carries some of 
the same harms as arbitrary car searches.  And Rubenfeld might find 
that such ever present drone monitoring generates in its target an 
                                                          
 170. Id. at 1064. 
 171. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 127 (2008). 
 172. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment:  Privacy or Mutual Trust 
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1777 (1994). 
 173. See generally id. at 1811–12 (summarizing the argument for an approach to 
Fourth Amendment analysis based on the concept of government-citizen trust). 
 174. See id. at 1788–93 (discussing the lengths the Supreme Court went to in order 
to justify finding that searches of garbage were outside the Fourth Amendment). 
 175. See id. at 1811–12 (explaining that the trust-based approach better aligns with 
democratic principles). 
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intense “fear of appearing ‘suspicious’ in the eyes of the state”—the 
precise fear the Fourth Amendment’s protections are designed to 
spare us.176 
Although these accounts often offer an emphasis on trust, security, 
or freedom from police abuse as an alternative to a privacy-based 
account of Fourth Amendment purposes, they are perhaps better 
understood as refinements of such a privacy-based account.  State 
surveillance that threatens Fourth Amendment values, does so in 
large part because it wrestles privacy away from citizens, leaving the 
private details of their lives exposed to review and examination by an 
outside observer.  Such a privacy violation is a necessary condition for 
a state measure to implicate Fourth Amendment interests, at least 
when the state avoids the kind of trespassory or other interference 
with property that itself counts as a Fourth Amendment search, but it 
is not a sufficient condition.  Rather, a privacy intrusion generally 
violates the Fourth Amendment only when it treats an innocent 
individual as a suspected criminal and thereby makes her more 
vulnerable to the state’s power of coercion and punishment. 
A police investigation that generates and stores records of our 
public movements and activities creates the effect of treating society 
as suspected criminals.  It not only reduces the privacy of those it 
records.  It also, as Justice Sotomayor explained, allows the 
government “more or less at will” to review innumerable details of an 
individual’s life for evidence of possible wrongdoing.177  As a result, 
people may be subjected to “arbitrary exercises of police power.”178 
B. Recording as a Dividing Line Between Searches and Non-Searches 
Recording should thus be central to Fourth Amendment law 
because, in the context of public surveillance, it allows authorities to 
sift through sensitive information about our movements and 
activities.  A recording transforms an ephemeral event into a 
permanent record.  It thus frees authorities from the burden (and 
cost) of having to observe the public’s movements and activities as 
they occur. It also removes the challenge of having to remember 
those movements well enough to compare or combine them with 
other observations in order to build a larger picture.  For example, 
                                                          
 176. Rubenfeld, supra note 171, at 127. 
 177. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (discussing the importance of considering a GPS device’s ability to allow 
recording and aggregation of the details of a person’s movements in determining if 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 178. Id. 
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the kind of “precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements” cannot be easily created unless a GPS unit not only 
transmits information to police about a person’s whereabouts, but 
also captures that information in electronic memory.179  In fact, 
Sotomayor explained in her concurrence that the fact that the GPS 
device allows recording and aggregation is precisely what allows the 
government to discover the private details of public activities.180 
Recording is also usually indispensable to creating the kind of 
detailed “mosaic” of a person’s life, which the D.C. Circuit found so 
concerning and identified as a basis for subjecting GPS surveillance 
to Fourth Amendment limits.  As the D.C. Circuit emphasized, with a 
record of a person’s movements over a several day long period, police 
can learn things about a person’s life that would be unknown to all 
other passersby who happen to see that person on roads or streets: 
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not 
told by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places 
over the course of a month.  The sequence of a person’s 
movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s 
office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks 
later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story.  A person 
who knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is a 
weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an 
unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an 
associate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just 
one such fact about a person, but all such facts.181 
The D.C. Circuit did not emphasize the difference between 
recording and merely observing activities in its opinion.  But the 
difference is important for its argument:  it is far more laborious for 
police to aggregate these details of a person’s activities unless it 
records each movement or action for later comparison with others.  
If, in the above example, a particular official does not have a record 
of the first visit to a gynecologist’s office, it is far less likely he will be 
able to combine it with the subsequent visit to the baby supply store 
to infer that the woman is expecting a child.  And it is unlikely that 
he will have access to the earlier detail, unless he is doing all of the 
tracking himself or working with a team of officers that are constantly 
sharing information that they have recorded.  It is conceivable that 
even without any recording device, officials could draw an inference 
                                                          
 179. Id. at 955. 
 180. See id. at 956 (arguing that this factor is important in determining society’s 
expectation of privacy). 
 181. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (footnote 
omitted), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
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from the woman’s two visits.  However, this becomes more 
implausible when an investigation aggregates not only two, but tens 
or hundreds of events. 
The latter type of investigation, as Justice Alito stated in his Jones 
concurrence, could hardly have happened in a world before GPS 
surveillance without “a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and 
perhaps aerial assistance.”182  Even in a pre-GPS form of extended 
location tracking, officials would need to create records of their 
target’s movements in order to share their observations with others 
on the team.183  At least one recent state court decision has treated 
the fact that one can imagine a more primitive analogue of 
automated recording as evidence that it cannot be a search.  In Foltz 
v. Commonwealth,184 the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that because 
“a police officer could have followed and personally recorded the 
movements of the van” without conducting a search, the use of a GPS 
recording device to track the van was not a search.185  But this is not 
the inevitable conclusion one might draw from such an analogy.  It 
would be extraordinarily difficult for a single officer to follow a van as 
continuously as a GPS device:  it would be an unusual officer, able to 
forego a significant amount of sleep, who could follow a van driver’s 
every (unpredictable) movement over the course of an entire week.  
A team of policemen, as Justice Alito recognized, would likely be 
required, and the fact that one can imagine a much more expensive 
and complicated low-technology analogue for GPS recording does 
not mean that GPS recording is not a search.186 
Recording is even more of a game-changing technology for video 
surveillance than it is in location tracking.  When police not only use 
video cameras on street lamps or drones for real time monitoring, 
but also to create video surveillance footage that may be subject to 
later review, they allow for a kind of investigation that is far more 
intrusive—and far more like a dragnet search—than real-time 
monitoring.  Not only can police aggregate and compare different 
events or actions, as they can in the context of location tracking, but 
they can also pause on a particular frame, examine it closely, and 
                                                          
 182. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 183. See infra Part II.C (describing the type of traditional police work necessary to 
record as much information as a GPS device). 
 184. 698 S.E.2d 281 (Va. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 732 S.E.2d 4 (Va. 2012). 
 185. See id. at 291–93 (reasoning that the use of GPS technology did not provide a 
substitute for police behavior that would have otherwise violated a right to privacy 
because the police could have followed and personally recorded the movements of 
the van). 
 186. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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notice small details of a person’s appearance or action that they 
would be very unlikely to notice if they had only one chance to 
perceive and remember an event as it occurred. 
At the extreme, a recording could create the kind of science fiction 
world Lewis Padgett depicted in the story, “Private Eye.”187  This is a 
world in which every action we take is recorded and stored in police-
owned video footage and in which officials can therefore watch the 
day-to-day existence of any individual the way most people watch a 
DVD or downloaded movie—by watching it unfold on a screen and 
pausing to rewind and review sequences that they did not fully 
perceive or understand the first time through.188  If officials subjected 
an individual who they have no reason to suspect of a crime to this 
kind of video review just to see if the video record happened to reveal 
anything suspicious, there is little question that they would be poring 
over personal details of that person’s life in much the same way they 
do in a more traditional “dragnet” search. 
Moreover, what is significant about video recording for Fourth 
Amendment purposes is not only the way it allows authorities to 
aggregate and compare many small details of our day-to-day lives, but 
also the power it gives them to pause on or review the same detail 
over and over again.  We normally miss a good deal of what is 
happening in a scene in front of our eyes.  Typically, people do not 
consciously perceive elements of a scene that they have no need to 
notice.189  Video recording, by contrast, captures the information our 
perception misses.  It replaces our flawed natural memory with an 
artificial replacement that lacks its imperfections and allows police to 
overcome its limits.190  In large part, for this reason, Justice Harlan 
wrote that even a form of surveillance that is not normally a search, 
                                                          
 187. See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1350–59 (citing Lewis Padgett, Private Eye, in THE 
MIRROR OF INFINITY:  A CRITICS’ ANTHOLOGY OF SCIENCE FICTION 99 (Robert Silverberg 
ed., 1970)) (proffering that science fiction has given us a view of the potential future 
of government surveillance and the need to reconsider the approach to the Fourth 
Amendment).  
 188. See Padgett, supra note 187, at 100 (describing a fictional “omniscience,” 
which stored a fifty-year history of light and sound images and was “a device for 
looking into the past”). 
 189. See CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA:  HOW OUR 
INTUITIONS DECEIVE US 5–7 (2009) (recounting an experiment in which individuals 
tasked with counting ball passes in a game depicted in a video failed to notice an 
appearance by an actor in a gorilla suit in the middle of the game); Daniel L. 
Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory:  Insights from Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience, 
54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 182, 186 (1999) (explaining experiments in which people fail 
to perceive significant elements in their environment such as the substitution of a 
different person for a stranger asking them directions). 
 190. See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1356 (describing how video recordings can be as 
intrusive as stop-and-frisks). 
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such as government use of an informant to gather information about 
a suspected drug dealer or other criminal, should become a search 
when the informant does not simply listen and remember what he is 
told, but also electronically transmits and records it.191  There is a 
constitutionally significant difference, he stated, between “third-party 
monitoring and recording which insures full and accurate disclosure 
of all that is said, free of the possibility of error and oversight that 
inheres in human reporting.”192  In a world in which individuals 
gossip about or share what they have observed, our privacy is 
threatened, but in a way that is often tolerable: 
Much off-hand exchange is easily forgotten and one may count on 
the obscurity of his remarks, protected by the very fact of a limited 
audience, and the likelihood that the listener will either overlook 
or forget what is said, as well as the listener’s inability to 
reformulate a conversation without having to contend with a 
documented record.193 
In a world of unrestrained recording, by contrast, there is no 
comfort in knowing that small and obscure aspects of our 
conversation will escape notice because recordings can be played 
over and over again to multiple listeners.  We do not have the power 
to “reformulate a conversation” by offering our own account.  The 
audio recording will provide an authoritative, and virtually 
indisputable, account.  It is thus inevitable, said Justice Harlan, that in 
a world of unrestrained recording “words would be measured a good 
deal more carefully and communication inhibited.”194 
In discussing audio recording, Justice Harlan focused primarily on 
its threat to privacy and its possible chilling effect on 
communication.195  For Fourth Amendment purposes, however, what 
is most worrisome about unconstrained video surveillance (or 
location tracking for that matter) is not simply that it substantially 
diminishes our privacy and leads us to refrain from taking 
spontaneous actions we worry may become part of a permanent 
record.  Instead, it is how this specific kind of diminution of privacy 
affects each individual’s relationship with state power.  While 
recording by anybody else (including other private individuals) 
                                                          
 191. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787–90 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (noting that transmitting or transcribing conversations is potentially 
more damaging to free society than the risk of an informant later reporting on a 
conversation). 
 192. Id. at 787. 
 193. Id. at 787–88. 
 194. Id. at 787. 
 195. Id. at 787–89. 
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reduces our privacy to some degree, systematic recording by the 
government diminishes it even more.  It allows the government to 
systematically analyze aspects of our lives, which, in a liberal, 
individual rights-based society, are not the government’s business.  
Furthermore, it permits the government to do so with the aim of 
finding, by chance, some basis for subjecting a person to the far 
greater degree of police power that has traditionally been reserved 
for those individuals who officials have reason to think are engaged 
in criminal activity. 
Given these observations about the effects of recording, one might 
wonder why the test proposed in this Article does not make all 
government recording a search and instead requires that, to 
constitute a search, an officer’s recording must be “remote,” meaning 
outside the realm that the recording officer can perceive with his 
eyes, ears, and other senses.  After all, Justice Harlan’s grave worries 
about recording seem to apply not just to a drone’s recording of 
events occurring far from the drone’s operator, but also to recordings 
that a police officer makes of what is happening in front of him.196  
Even in a public space, the presence of a government-recording 
device may chill a citizen’s speech or other expressive activity—even if 
a single police officer operates the device and it is not a part of a 
massive, surreptitious, surveillance system. 
However, for Fourth Amendment purposes, there is an important 
difference between a police officer recording his own interactions, 
and that which the government gathers from pedestrians and drivers 
throughout public space.  As suggested above, the point of the 
Fourth Amendment is not simply to protect privacy, but to prevent 
the state from engaging in the kind of privacy violation that occurs in 
a dragnet investigation or other “general search” where the state 
reaches out and subjects individual actions to extensive or 
penetrating analysis.197  By contrast, where recording is not remote—
where a camera mounted on a police car simply captures footage of a 
police officer’s interactions at a traffic stop, or a police officer uses an 
iPhone (or a camera in his uniform) to capture events that occur on 
a street around him—then the recording is far less amenable to being 
used to create a searchable archive of an individual’s detailed 
movements and activities.  By contrast, “uniform cams,” tiny cameras 
                                                          
 196. See generally id. at 787 (failing to differentiate between transmitting and 
transcribing of conversations). 
 197. See supra notes 156–72 and accompanying text (explaining that the Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy is much narrower that the common understanding of 
the right to privacy and that the Fourth Amendment only seeks to protect 
unreasonable invasions of privacy, such as police fishing expeditions with no limits). 
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built into an officer’s uniform to record each encounter a police 
officer has with a citizen, are designed and used to archive the police 
officer’s own encounters with citizens.198  They are not designed to 
gather data about innumerable citizen activities happening far from 
the officer that are unrelated to what the officer is doing.199  They are 
intended, as one former police chief puts it, to “collect[] and 
preserv[e] the best evidence about every encounter between the 
police officer and the community.”200  
The larger concern about uniform or dashboard cams is not the 
privacy threat they raise in each encounter they record, but rather 
what police might do by technologically enhancing or aggregating 
such image-capture.  If police combine—into a central, searchable 
data collection—the images that each of them captures on a uniform 
or dashboard-mounted camera, such action could begin to mimic the 
effects of a larger recording system.  However, a definition of “search” 
broad enough include any action that could threaten privacy, in 
combination with other surveillance measures, would cover far too 
much ground:  Virtually any kind of police observation could, in 
combination with other measures, threaten our privacy and perhaps 
even allow arbitrary fishing expeditions.  A technological form-based 
or design-based test of the kind proposed in this Article would be of 
little import if it were this broad. 
To be sure, one can imagine scenarios in which police uniform 
cams or dashboard cams are designed not to serve their current 
purpose of preserving records about each police officer’s encounter 
with the community, but rather to sweep in, and preserve for later 
review, evidence about citizens’ actions and movement.  Imagine for 
example, that instead of mounting a camera that records merely what 
is in front of the car, police mount a camera like the rotating cameras 
mounted on top of Google’s Street View vehicles,201 that constantly 
captures footage from the 360-degree field surrounding the police 
car each minute and magnifies each part of this visual field to reveal 
                                                          
 198. See Janice Morse, Tiny Uniform Cams Next Big Thing in Policing, USA TODAY 
(May 7, 2013, 6:36 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/07 
/tiny-police-cameras/2140483 (noting that the uniform cameras cannot lie and are 
intended to provide an accurate account of what occurs in the course of police 
work). 
 199. See id. (discussing how cameras worn on uniforms are the next step beyond 
dashboard cameras). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Behind the Scenes:  Street View, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/maps 
/about/behind-the-scenes/streetview (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (describing how the 
Google Street View car is capable of taking 360-degree panoramic images to create 
three-dimensional models of the photographed environment).  
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details of every person and car passing by.  Although such a police car 
camera technically only captures data from the realm that the officer 
can potentially see and hear, it might still collect a worrisome amount 
of data about individual citizens. In fact, such a video surveillance 
system threatens Fourth Amendment values in the same way as a city-
wide system of video recording carried out from stationary cameras or 
aerial drones:  The cameras simply happen to be mounted on police 
cars rather than on lamp-posts or drones.  In such a circumstance, 
courts should find that police do engage in a search when they use 
the combined, programmatic use of police car cameras to create, and 
later review, ongoing records of citizens’ movements. 
C. Extensions:  When Magnification—and Recording—Should Count as 
Searches and When They Should Not 
This Article so far has argued that police conduct a Fourth 
Amendment search when they remotely record a person’s actions or 
movements, whether they do so with a drone-based camera, a 
network of street cameras, or a GPS-tracking device.  As noted earlier, 
such recording enables government officials to search public lives frame-by-
frame, much in the way it might search documents file-by-file.  But while 
remote recording is the clearest type of search in a public space, it is 
not necessarily the only type.  Even in the absence of any recording, 
police might take advantage of other surveillance technologies to 
circumvent the traditional Fourth Amendment protection for our 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”  Using a high-powered 
telescope, for example, officials gather information from the inside 
of a person’s home that they might otherwise obtain only by entering 
the house or the curtilage. 
There is certainly precedent for the Supreme Court to classify a 
form of surveillance as a “search” when it is the functional equivalent 
of surveillance that would be a search.  In Kyllo, the Court found that 
police engaged in a search of a home when they pointed a thermal 
imager at the home from the street outside to measure the heat 
emissions in order to determine if there likely was a marijuana-
growing lamp within.202  This was not, of course, a traditional home 
search:  the officers never entered the house.203  They simply 
measured the heat leaking through its walls from a public street 
where they had every right to be without a warrant.204  The Supreme 
                                                          
 202. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 34 (2001). 
 203. See id. at 30 (noting the search was performed from the passenger seat of the 
agent’s car). 
 204. See id. 
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Court nonetheless held that these heat measurements from the 
outside were a search, largely because their intrusion into the home 
was functionally equivalent to a home entry.205 
In fact, this concept of functional equivalence was built into the 
test that the Supreme Court proposed for how to apply the Fourth 
Amendment to the use of “sense enhancing” technologies to observe 
the home.  The Court held that the use of such technology counts as 
a search when it is employed to obtain information that otherwise 
could have been obtained only through “physical ‘intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area.’”206  The Court added the caveat that 
this applies only to technology that “is not in general public use.”207  
So while police are subject to Fourth Amendment constraints when 
collecting heat measurements from the home with a thermal imager, 
they might be free of such limits if they instead look at the home’s 
walls with the same kind of binoculars available to bird watchers, 
sports fans, or amateur astronomers.208  Perhaps this is because unlike 
thermal imagers, which people do not expect to have pointed at their 
houses in the course of their normal day-to-day existence, binocular-
viewers are a common part of life in modern society, and individuals 
who wish to safeguard their privacy cannot expect that their 
activities will always escape magnification by others in their 
neighborhood.  Still, the Supreme Court made clear that it will not 
allow police to circumvent the Fourth Amendment command that 
searches of a home be reasonable.209  Invading the home 
technologically from outside its walls is as much a Fourth 
Amendment search as invading it physically. 
Public surveillance might sometimes cross a Fourth Amendment 
line and trigger reasonableness requirements, not only when it 
involves magnification of in-home activities, but also when it is the 
functional equivalent of other categories of searches.  For example, if 
                                                          
 205. See id. at 33–34 (basing their finding on the fact that the sensors provided 
information that otherwise only would have been obtainable by physical intrusion). 
 206. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 
(2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (finding that use of a drug detecting dog to alert to 
drugs inside the house uses a sense-enhancing “device” to invade the house in a way 
equivalent to a home entry). 
 207. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 208. It is not clear how the Supreme Court would rule on this.  In Kyllo, the Court 
noted that use of technological enhancement had not been completely resolved.  Id. 
at 33.  In upholding the use of magnification in Dow Chemical Co., the Court noted 
that an important factor was that the area photographed was not near a home.  Dow 
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.3 (1986). 
 209. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (analyzing the search of a home using thermal images 
for reasonableness)  
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future police officers use a zoom camera to hone in on a person’s 
pockets or wallet, or the book or letter he is holding in his hand, such 
public surveillance can reveal to police what they could otherwise 
learn only by physically rummaging through his pockets or wallet, or 
asking him to hand over the book or letter for official review.  If so, 
then such magnification would arguably allow police with sense-
enhancing technology to do what they could otherwise do only with a 
search of a person, his papers, or his effects.  Under those 
circumstances, perhaps, the Supreme Court should react as it did in 
Kyllo.  Just as the Court did not permit government officials there to 
collect, from afar, information about the home’s interior life that it 
could otherwise have taken only by physical entry, it might similarly 
bar officials from collecting difficult-to-observe details about a person 
or what he is carrying that they could otherwise obtain only by 
stopping a person and searching his belongings.210 
In fact, such a stance on magnification could help explain the 
Supreme Court’s otherwise puzzling statements in the aerial 
surveillance cases.  As noted earlier, the Court in those cases 
suggested that observation of a home’s curtilage from planes and 
helicopters normally raised no Fourth Amendment concerns but 
might well do so if they captured “intimate activities.”211  This activity-
based criterion for aerial searches seems at odds with the way the 
Court normally analyzes searches in or around a home.  After all, 
when courts ask if police need a warrant to enter a home, they do not 
ask whether the home search is aimed at uncovering intimate details 
or more impersonal information.212  Rather, they assume, as Justice 
Scalia explained in Kyllo, that “[i]n the home, . . . all details are 
intimate details”213 and, on that basis, require a warrant for any entry 
                                                          
 210. One might object that such functional equivalence is a false one.  High-
powered magnification, for example, might be the high-tech equivalent not of what a 
police officer does when he seizes and reviews personal effects or documents (a 
search), but rather of what he does when he takes a furtive glance at someone’s 
reading materials or possessions from a nearby seat in a restaurant or park.  High-
powered amplification likewise might be more akin to listening to the personal 
argument between a nearby couple than it is to intercepting a phone call between 
them.  But where telescopic viewing or amplification gives an official a covert way to 
observe what they would otherwise have to do by being present, this technological 
shift in the challenge they face should make a constitutional difference. 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 124–134; see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, 
PRIVACY AT RISK:  THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
59, 62 (2007) (mentioning factors that courts consider when determining whether 
surveillance of a home’s curtilage is too invasive and observing that surveillance of a 
home’s interior would entail different, heightened protections). 
 212. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.  Absent exigent 
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”). 
 213. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. 
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into the home.  If, as the Supreme Court has sometimes phrased it, a 
backyard or other curtilage surrounding the home receives Fourth 
Amendment protection because it is an “extension of [the] home,”214 
then why treat its protection as variable?  Why understand the 
curtilage’s Fourth Amendment shield to protect some of the activity 
that police can observe from a public vantage point but not other 
kinds of activities that occur in the same location and are just as open 
to observation?  One possible answer is that, if the Court protects 
intimate details in the curtilage from scrutiny by high-powered drone 
cameras, it is because they are the kinds of details that police could 
not traditionally and typically learn without searching a person, her 
house, her documents, or her effects.  Such a rule might also make 
sense because just as people cannot prevent certain evidence of in-
home activities from leaking out—for example, in the form of heat 
emissions—they also cannot completely and continuously conceal 
their private documents and personal items from exposure to the 
outside world.  Individuals in the modern world will occasionally have 
to read an e-mail or mark-up a memo as they ride on a subway or sit 
in an airport.  They will occasionally read a book as they rest in a park 
or a plaza or check the readings on a personal fitness monitor as they 
walk through a public space. 
The fact that individuals have little choice but to bring these items 
into public space, where powerful cameras may magnify them and 
give officials a closer look, does not mean that they are fair game for 
untrammeled official scrutiny.  The Supreme Court noted in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.215 that even when students enter the closely supervised 
and monitored environment of a school, they often have no choice 
but to bring with them numerous personal items, including “keys, 
money, and the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming,” as 
well as “photographs, letters, and diaries.”216  The Court emphasized 
that these items remain protected from arbitrary searches, even in 
the tightly controlled confines of a school.217  It is hard to see why 
                                                          
 214. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15 (2013) (“[T]he curtilage of 
the house . . . enjoys protection as part of the home itself.”); United States v. Dunn, 
480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (outlining the historical origins of the idea of curtilage in 
common law); see also id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing that “curtilage is 
the area which extends the intimate activity associated with . . . a man’s home and 
the privacies of life” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 215. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 216. Id. at 339. 
 217. See id. at 339–43 (striking a balance in schools between permitting entirely 
arbitrary searches and requiring warrants for every search). 
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students (or other individuals) would lose such protection in a 
public space. 
The same is true of cell phone conversations.  Conversations that 
once took place entirely over phone lines between home phones, 
office phones, and pay phones now increasingly take place over cell 
phones, often as one or both speakers are walking down the street, 
waiting at an airport, or sitting in a coffee shop.  It seems odd to 
think that a modern-day Katz could be constitutionally subjected to 
electronic eavesdropping by government officials armed with 
parabolic microphones or other sound amplification devices because 
the private conversation he had to conduct from a phone booth on 
the street in 1967 would today take place over a cell phone call 
from the same street.  Thus, Professor Wayne LaFave’s proposal 
that the Fourth Amendment be understood to protect against use 
of hidden microphones or recording devices, even in public space, 
seems justified.218 
To be sure, Kyllo’s doctrine of functional equivalence should be 
applied with caution:  Every police method that uncovers details 
about a suspect is, at a high level of generality, functionally similar to 
other methods of uncovering the same details.  Police unable to 
obtain evidence of a drug conspiracy from a suspect’s home will have 
to try to find evidence of the conspiracy elsewhere, such as in public 
space or in third-party records.  The match between evidence sought 
outside the home, and that which is inside the home, does not—and 
should not—automatically transform the public, or third-party 
record, surveillance into a search. 
One key advantage of the technological form-based or design-
based test proposed in this Article is that it provides a clearer line 
between searches and non-searches in a public space—and this line 
would be easily blurred if the doctrine of functional equivalence were 
applied too freely.  Consider, for example, the difficulties that might 
arise if courts not only accepted this Article’s proposal to count 
remote recording as a search, but also classified as a search all 
techniques they found to have effects equivalent to remote recording. 
Consider, for example, the type of search that Justice Alito identified 
                                                          
 218. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.2(e), at 442–43 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting that privacy expectations 
are more reasonable for private conversations that take place in a public place than 
for actions that take place in public space); see also Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance:  
Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 36 (2004) (considering a 
“presence of electronic surveillance” test under which “any conversation a police 
officer could hear unaided would not be private, but those that required a wiretap or 
a bug would be constitutionally protected”). 
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as an earlier-era equivalent of GPS tracking:  an operation that 
follows a suspect’s movements with a team of officers, multiple 
vehicles, and aerial observation.219  Even without a recording device, 
such tracking may threaten to impose a temporary dragnet on an 
individual.  By following his movements and activities from place to 
place, police may make an observation that gives them justification to 
move in for a pat-down or an arrest.  Or, consider a simpler version of 
such tracking:  one officer tails a person’s vehicle, observes what the 
suspect does when he exits the vehicle and whether he goes into any 
particular offices or homes.  The officer then reports his observations 
by cell phone to another officer at the station house, who writes down 
any observations that either of the officers believes to be of interest.  
Such observation and dictation might produce, with less advanced 
technology, records equivalent to those captured with automated 
video recording or location tracking.220  Or, in a situation more akin 
to the GPS tracking in Jones, police could use a GPS-tracking device 
that transmits to the police station, but does not record, the location 
that a car is in at a particular moment. 
In such circumstances, it is plausible that a court intent on 
safeguarding Fourth Amendment interests would classify the 
systematic tracking that takes place as a search, even in the absence of 
an automated recording.  Doing so may seem necessary to block 
police from circumventing the limits that apply to recording.  
However, it is not clear, why, if police become subject to Fourth 
Amendment requirements when they follow a person with multiple 
vehicles for a day, they do not likewise engage in a Fourth 
Amendment search for twenty minutes.  All such tracking potentially 
raises some of the same dangers raised by ongoing recording of a 
person’s movements.  But that does not mean all of it should count as 
a “search.”  And the same problems that make the mosaic theory 
problematic also confront a proposal to count police tracking as a 
search only when it goes on long enough or involves a certain 
number of vehicles or officers. 
                                                          
 219. See United States v, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (describing what would have been needed to accomplish the 
search before the advent of GPS-tracking technology). 
 220. Indeed, when Justice Harlan insisted that there is a constitutionally 
significant difference between “third-party monitoring and recording,” United States 
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the “recording” that so 
disturbed him was this kind of primitive record creation.  Instead of secretly audio 
recording his conversation with the target of the investigation, the informant wore a 
bug that transmitted the conversation to an officer outside who surreptitiously 
listened and then testified after the informant disappeared.  Id. at 746–47 (plurality 
opinion). 
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III. OBJECTIONS, ALTERNATIVES, AND LIMITS:  DIFFERENT WAYS OF 
DEFINING A “SEARCH” (AND A “REASONABLE SEARCH”) IN PUBLIC 
There are two major objections one might offer against this 
definition of what kinds of investigatory methods count as a “search” 
in a public space.  First, one might argue that it is too restrictive or 
that it would leave police unable to effectively investigate and deter 
crime.  Second, one might argue that it is not restrictive enough; it 
places too much police work outside of the Constitution’s search and 
seizure limits, which presents a serious threat to privacy. 
A. The Objection that the Test Leaves Police Needing Greater Freedom To 
Investigate 
This objection requires a brief examination of how Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standards apply to police investigative 
methods.  Focusing on what kind of police activity the Fourth 
Amendment covers is only the first step in the two-step inquiry courts 
must undertake to decide if police activity violates the Constitution.  
The fact that the Constitution and its requirements cover a particular 
investigatory method does not mean that the search violates the 
Constitution.  Rather, a search is constitutionally impermissible only 
when it is “unreasonable.”221  So, even if GPS tracking or video 
surveillance in public counts as a search, courts will allow such 
surveillance when it is reasonable.222  Traditional searches, such as 
home entries, are reasonable only if police first obtain a warrant 
based on probable cause.223  This was also what the Supreme Court 
assumed police would have to do if they wished to attach a GPS 
device to a car to track the driver’s movements, as they did in Jones.224  
However, obtaining a warrant will not always be practical.  In fact, it is 
implausible to require camera operators to obtain a warrant each 
time they record citizens’ activities in public streets.  Some existing 
camera systems collect data continuously and such warrantless 
operation of video surveillance is often necessary to its effectiveness.  
Police cannot be expected to seek a warrant for video images the 
value of which is apparent only after a crime has occurred, as was the 
                                                          
 221. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (“It goes without saying that the 
Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and seizures.”); see U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
 222. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 331–32. 
 223. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“[S]earches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”). 
 224. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49 (finding that a valid warrant is necessary for a 
Fourth Amendment search to be reasonable). 
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case in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing investigation and in the 
earlier July 2005 investigation of the London subway bombings.225 
One possible response is to argue that this kind of video 
surveillance should not count as a search at all because, unlike the 
GPS surveillance in Jones, it does not target any particular person.  
Instead, it routinely collects information from the streets in the event 
that the camera’s images reveal a crime, a threat to public safety or 
capture evidence later needed for a criminal investigation.226 
The problem with this objection is that it ignores the ways in which 
general collection of evidence can bring the state one step away from 
a targeted investigation and undermine Fourth Amendment interests 
even before it reaches that targeting stage.  Consider, for example, a 
hypothetical police program which uses a thermal imager to collect 
heat measurements from all houses in a particular region in the event 
that police, at a later time, decide to search the information for 
evidence of marijuana-growing heat lamps or other evidence of 
criminal activity that might be found in the heat measurements.  If, as 
the Supreme Court ruled in Kyllo, police engage in a search when 
they point a thermal imaging device at a single house they suspect of 
housing marijuana, they must also engage in a search when they point 
that device at many houses and lack any particular suspicion about 
the residents of those houses.  Even if they do not intend to examine 
the heat measurements they collect until some unspecified later date 
and are not sure what they will find, they will still have crossed the 
line that, according to Kyllo, makes their investigatory activity a 
search.227  Their general search has collected evidence from the 
interior of a home that they could not otherwise have obtained 
except by entry into the home.  Likewise, if instead of attaching a 
GPS unit to a particular car as they did in Jones, police surreptitiously 
tacked such units onto hundreds of cars parked in a city sidewalk to 
see (at some unspecified later time) if any of them moved in patterns 
characteristic of a drug dealer or purchaser, it is hard to see why the 
                                                          
 225. See Keith Proctor, The Great Surveillance Boom, CNNMONEY (Apr. 26, 2013, 4:56 
PM), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2013/04/26/video-surveillance-boston-
bombings (documenting the challenges of using video surveillance to investigate and 
prevent incidents such as the Boston Marathon and London subway bombings). 
 226. See, e.g., Allison Linn, Post 9/11, Surveillance Cameras Everywhere, NBCNEWS 
(Aug. 23, 2011, 7:38 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44163852/ns/business-
us_business/t/post-surveillance-cameras-everywhere (asserting that officials typically 
use security cameras not to catch terrorists, but to gather evidence of wrongdoing 
and apprehend common criminals); Proctor, supra note 225 (observing that cameras 
do little to prevent crime and instead aid in collecting evidence on criminals once a 
crime has already occurred). 
 227. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
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general version of such an investigation would be any less a search 
than the targeted variant that actually occurred in Jones.  Indeed, 
some courts have argued that it was this type of general surveillance 
that the Supreme Court in Knotts suggested would be especially 
problematic.228  In Knotts, the Court stated that while it was not a 
search to track a driver on public roads with use of a single beeper, it 
might be a search if police used such technology to conduct “dragnet-
type” surveillance involving “twenty-four hour surveillance of any 
citizen of this country.”229  Consequently, if video or other recording 
of remote activities is a search when it targets a particular individual, 
it should be just as much a Fourth Amendment search when police 
record many individuals’ activities and movement before (even long 
before) they decide upon whom to focus. 
That does not mean, however, that police absolutely need a 
warrant or individualized suspicion to record activity in public 
space.230  As Christopher Slobogin argued, courts analyzing video 
surveillance could adapt certain aspects of their case law on 
roadblocks, where courts have relaxed warrant and individualized 
suspicion requirements; in these circumstances, they nevertheless 
insisted that officials incorporate privacy protections into their 
searches.231  Likewise, as argued previously, if obtaining a warrant is 
impossible for police using ongoing video surveillance, they might 
instead have to satisfy the kind of “constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant”232 that the Supreme Court has sometimes 
demanded in certain school or workplace search cases, or other 
situations where officials are using searches to meet a need beyond 
ordinary law enforcement purposes.233  In these cases, instead of 
                                                          
 228. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 & n.6 (deciding the case on a trespassory 
standard but noting that under a reasonable expectation of privacy standard, Knotts 
indicates that “dragnet-type law enforcement practices,” like those involved in GPS 
tracking, might be problematic (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 
(1983))). 
 229. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283–85. 
 230. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (explaining that warrant and 
probable cause requirements may not apply to certain types of searches or police 
activities because such requirements are impractical under the circumstances); see 
also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338–41 (1985) (dispensing with the warrant 
and probable cause requirements in school settings, but refusing to lower the 
standard to that applicable in the prison setting). 
 231. Slobogin, supra note 38, at 288–90. 
 232. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981). 
 233. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650, 664–65 (1995) 
(finding mandatory drug testing of student athletes constitutional); Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660–61, 664–68 (1989) (upholding drug 
testing for hiring and promoting employees for certain U.S. Customs Service 
positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606, 620–21, 624 (1988) 
(“The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to 
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requiring that police have individualized suspicion, the Supreme 
Court has required other, system-wide privacy protections.  These 
protections often emphasize (1) standardization, (2) unintrusiveness, 
and (3) clear necessity given a serious security risk.234  This ensures 
that officers have minimal discretion in their searches and that the 
searches are brief, reveal little information, and can often be avoided 
easily; given the obvious necessity, determination by a neutral 
magistrate would be excessive under the circumstance.235  While this 
Article does not explore how such “warrant substitutes,” which have 
typically applied outside of the criminal context, would apply to 
police use of public surveillance to pursue law enforcement 
objectives, such an adaptation is possible.  Classifying video 
surveillance as a search does not mean that it will be an option only 
when police already have the probable cause that they believe the 
video surveillance itself will give them. 
B. The Objection that the Test Leaves Government with Too Much 
Opportunity for Unjustified Surveillance 
1. Expanding the definition of a “search” to cover other privacy intrusions 
by government 
While this Article argues for an extension of the Fourth 
Amendment to cover public surveillance, there is potentially a 
significant amount of public surveillance that the proposed test 
would not cover.  Consider, for example, a situation in which a police 
officer decides to spend an hour following a person whom she 
notices traveling down the street.  Imagine that, while doing so, the 
officer snaps a picture or takes some video footage with an iPhone or 
digital camera, but does not use an optical zoom lens to magnify the 
camera’s image.  While such image capture would involve recording, 
the officer would not be recording remote activities; she would not be 
recording events outside of her presence.  Nor would she be 
engaging in the functional equivalent of remote recording when she 
engages in close observation only of events within her field of view. 
For some scholars, judges, or lawyers, this limit on Fourth 
Amendment coverage may well be unjustified.  Indeed, Christopher 
                                                          
ensure safety, like its . . . operation of a government office, school, or prison, . . . may 
justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.”); 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–41 (explaining that a warrant requirement and a “reasonable 
grounds” for suspicion standard would both be inappropriate to maintaining order 
in schools). 
 234. Blitz, supra note 45, at 1457–58. 
 235. Id. 
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Slobogin presented a thoughtful case for defining a Fourth 
Amendment search more broadly than presented in this Article.236  
More specifically, he offered two types of arguments for a broader 
definition of “search”:  one argument focused on interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment itself and the other in a suggested surveillance 
statute which, because it is a statute, may cover more territory than 
the Fourth Amendment itself.237 
Slobogin’s argument about the Fourth Amendment’s coverage is 
largely based on the notion that the core purpose of the Amendment 
is to protect what the Supreme Court has said that it protects since 
Katz—namely, individuals’ actual and reasonable expectations of 
privacy.238  Understanding the scope of the Amendment’s protection 
therefore requires understanding what these expectations are.  As 
Slobogin has argued in an article co-authored by Joel Schumacher, 
this is a task that demands not merely armchair reflection, but 
collection of evidence about how Americans actually think about 
their privacy.239  Based on this work, he wrote that individuals expect 
far more privacy than the Supreme Court has recognized in its 
Fourth Amendment cases, finding, for example, that video 
surveillance of the kind that appears to be outside the Supreme 
Court’s definition of a search is more intrusive than investigatory 
methods that the Court has labeled a search.240  In short, he argued 
that the Court has refused to categorize as searches “a vast array of 
investigative techniques” that clearly threaten individuals’ widely 
shared expectations of privacy, including public surveillance 
techniques people clearly view as invasive.241 
                                                          
 236. See Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a 
Surveillance Society:  A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 13–15 (2012) (suggesting that courts define a Fourth Amendment 
“search” as a layman would and that a proportionality principle should apply when 
determining the necessity of a warrant or other protective measures).   
 237. See generally id. at 5–32 (analyzing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
tests, redefining “search,” laying out a statutory scheme, and commenting on the 
proposed provisions).   
 238. Id. at 5–6, 9–13 (rejecting property as the best foundation for privacy laws 
and advocating for a broader definition akin to Katz’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard); see also Slobogin, supra note 38, at 217 (framing the issue in terms 
of a right to anonymity).   
 239. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 159, at 732 (explaining the need for 
empirical study and reflection on this issue); see also Slobogin, supra note 38, at 271–
72, 275–80 (detailing a further study similar to that conducted by Slobogin and 
Schumacher). 
 240. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 211, at 33, 110–13 (noting that in many cases, “a 
wide chasm exists between the Court’s holdings and our subjects’ intrusiveness 
rankings”); see also Slobogin, supra note 38, at 271–72, 275–80 (detailing his more 
recent empirical study).   
 241. SLOBOGIN, supra note 211, at 31–32. 
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Slobogin’s statutory proposal is even more extensive.242  The 
definition of “search,” in a well-drafted surveillance law, he argued, 
should cover any “effort by government to find or discern evidence of 
unlawful conduct.”243  It does not matter whether a police officer 
looks for such evidence with the aid of technology or “with the naked 
eye.”244  “The officer who watches an individual walking down the 
street to see what transpires is conducting a search under this 
definition whether she does so with her unaided vision, binoculars, 
closed-circuit television, or a drone.”245  Slobogin emphasized that 
focusing on a statutory formulation freed him to “go[] beyond 
anything the Fourth Amendment requires, in either scope or 
detail.”246  He suggested, however, that this model statute might also 
help guide and sharpen thinking about Fourth Amendment rules for 
public surveillance.247 
Such a broad definition of a search certainly has some advantages.  
It is, as Slobogin and other scholars observed,248 closer in many 
respects to the way a layperson would define the word “search.”249  In 
common usage, a person is typically described as “searching” for 
something when he is engaged in a focused attempt to find it, 
regardless of whether he is attempting to do so in a house or an open 
fields or whether he has any sophisticated technology to aid him.250  A 
person can search for a coin dropped on the sidewalk, for example, 
simply by scanning his surroundings.  Moreover, this broad definition 
of a search deprives unscrupulous—or heavily pressured—
government officials of the temptation to circumvent Fourth 
Amendment requirements simply by shifting to technologies or 
strategies that are unfamiliar to the courts.  Under Slobogin’s all-
                                                          
 242. See Slobogin, supra note 236, at 16–34 (expounding on the definitions and 
substantive rules for various types of searches). 
 243. Id. at 17. 
 244. Id. at 18. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 5. 
 247. See id. at 4–5 (indicating that one purpose of his article was to resolve debates 
about which Fourth Amendment theories might serve as alternatives to the “mosaic 
theory”). 
 248. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
768 (1994) (arguing that “scanning [a] crowd,” even in public, counts as a “search,” 
but that such a search is clearly constitutional); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New 
Under the Sun?  A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 
MERCER L. REV. 507, 544 (2005) (arguing that search and seizure “are (and were, at 
the time of the founding) ordinary, commonplace words” and should “bear that 
ordinary meaning”). 
 249. Id. at 13, 17. 
 250. See Search Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/search (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (defining “search” as “look[ing] into 
or over carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover something”). 
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methods-covered definition, officials cannot hope to free themselves 
from legal restraints by substituting far-away drone observation for 
trespassory GPS tracking or by foregoing advanced surveillance 
technology and instead using more old fashioned methods of 
tracking a driver.  No matter what methods they use to track or watch 
a person over time, the Fourth Amendment will cover their 
investigatory observations. 
The problem with such a broad definition of a “search,” however, is 
that if it were made the basis of a constitutional rule, it would likely 
impose Fourth Amendment constraints on virtually every observation 
that police make.  Simply by noticing and watching an event that 
seems, to an officer, to merit closer attention, that officer would place 
himself on Fourth Amendment territory.  This, however, is a 
counterintuitive way to think about how the Fourth Amendment 
operates.  The Amendment’s language is not designed to constrain 
everything a police officer sees or focuses her attention on, however 
temporarily or casually.  Instead, it is written to cover a particular 
subset of police activity—namely “searches” of particular targets:  
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”251  It makes sense, therefore, to 
treat as a search circumstances in which police enter, or otherwise 
physically explore, a person, her house, or her documents and 
property.  It also makes sense to treat as a search circumstances in 
which police use technology to investigate an object without touching 
or entering it, for example, by magnifying it or creating a continuous 
record of its activity from a remote location. 
One alternative is to limit the definition of search by focusing on a 
police officer’s motives rather than his methods.  Christopher 
Slobogin’s definition of search, for instance, arguably includes a 
motive requirement because it technically applies not to every 
observation a government official makes, but only to those 
observations that are part of “[a]n effort . . . to find or discern 
unlawful conduct.”252  But it is not clear how such a motive 
requirement would place any significant limitation on Fourth 
Amendment coverage.  The central mission of the police is to watch 
for and respond to unlawful conduct, and when they attend to a 
person or event while they are on duty, it is likely that a court will 
presume they are doing so as part of their job description.  In fact, 
without such a presumption, the line between searches and non-
searches will rest on the outcome of a difficult inquiry into hidden 
                                                          
 251. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 252. Slobogin, supra note 236, at 17. 
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subjective motives—of precisely the sort that the Supreme Court has 
been intent on avoiding in the context of determining whether 
police have probable cause for a traffic stop and automobile search.253 
A more modest expansion for the test described above would apply 
Fourth Amendment limitations to all recordings, or record creation 
in general, rather than covering only remote police recording.  Even 
when an officer simply snaps an iPhone photo of what is directly in 
front of her, one might argue, she engages in a search.  The Fourth 
Amendment might give her more leeway to conduct such a simple, 
relatively unintrusive search than it gives a team of officers operating 
a drone-based camera or collecting and reviewing footage from a city-
wide surveillance system.  But such leeway would still be limited by 
search and seizure protection that would, for example, forbid 
capturing iPhone pictures of people or events that she has no reason 
to suspect have any connection to criminal activity. 
There is, however, a problem with a rule that makes any police 
observation a search as soon as it is accompanied by even the simplest 
kind of record creation.  Police activity that precisely mirrors that 
which individuals engage in every day would be converted into a 
matter of constitutional law.  Thanks to the miniaturization of 
cameras and their incorporation into the cell phones, individuals 
carry cameras with them almost everywhere, and there are few 
activities in public spaces that are off-limits to photo and video 
recording.  In fact, police have often found themselves being video 
recorded by citizens wielding iPhone cameras or other recording 
devices, and a number of appellate courts have found that individuals 
have a First Amendment right to record police in this way.254  It is 
conceivable that the same individual who has a constitutional right to 
record police officers also has a constitutional right to avoid being 
video recorded by the same police officers they are video recording.  
                                                          
 253. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996) (asserting that the 
Court has never invalidated a Fourth Amendment search based on an officer’s 
subjective motive and that the Fourteenth Amendment provides the appropriate 
protections for challenging discriminatory police behavior). 
 254. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that an Illinois eavesdropping statute that would ban nonconsensual audio-
recording of public officials likely fails intermediate scrutiny and infringes on First 
Amendment rights); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (emphasizing 
that there is a constitutional right to record police in the course of their public 
duties because public recording of government officials can play an essential role in 
stimulating “the free discussion of governmental affairs” and protection of freedom 
(quoting Mills v. Alabama 384 U.S. 214, 217 (1966))); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 
F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[t]he First Amendment protects 
the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, 
and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest,” including a right “to 
photograph or videotape police conduct”). 
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But such a rule has problematic implications.  Unlike remote 
recording with drone cameras or citywide video systems, using an 
iPhone to snap a photograph of one’s surroundings is, in many 
respects, simply a modern form of note taking.  As Professor Seth 
Kreimer wrote while arguing for extending First Amendment 
protections to image capture, “[r]ecorded images can serve the same 
function” as the “sense impressions or . . . sketches in [a] diary.”255  It 
seems unlikely that the Fourth Amendment places police on 
constitutional territory every time they supplement their own 
perception or memory in the way that ordinary citizens do every day.   
In fact, the desire to avoid such a result was likely what caused the 
Supreme Court to note in Kyllo that use of sense enhancement 
technology probably would not count as a search when that 
technology was “in general public use,” unless it were aimed at a 
house or other private environment.256  The “general public use” test 
has been the target of scholarly criticism,257 and critics are right to 
argue that the Supreme Court would invite chaos and confusion if 
what counted as a search changed each year as new technologies and 
cultural practices transformed the way people interact with public 
space.258  But whatever its flaws as a black letter law test, the general 
public use requirement at least captures a powerful intuition about 
Fourth Amendment law:  it should not subject all police observation 
and record-creation to heightened judicial scrutiny.  The question 
rather, is what kind of police monitoring in public must be subject to 
Fourth Amendment limits and what kind of garden-variety police 
observation remains free of such limits.  It is probably implausible to 
                                                          
 255. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment:  Memory, 
Discourse, and the Right To Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 380 (2011). 
 256. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).  
 257. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 211, at 57–58, 62–65 (positing that public use is 
a blurry line that could refer either to how easily the general public can acquire the 
technology or to how frequently the general public uses the technology); Douglas 
Adkins, The Supreme Court Announces a Fourth Amendment “General Public Use” Standard 
for Emerging Technologies but Fails To Define It:  Kyllo v. United States, 27 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 245, 262 (2002) (criticizing the Kyllo “general public use” doctrine as completely 
unworkable and asserting that “the Court must have intended something . . . other 
than actual use by the public”). 
 258. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment:  
The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 23 (1996) (noting that “[t]he 
type of technology the public can possess may change with surprising speed”); Tracey 
Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology:  Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-
First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 105 (2002) (“[W]hether a particular device is in general 
public use should have no impact on Fourth Amendment analysis.”); Christopher 
Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment:  Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules 
Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2002) (observing 
that courts will have “to deal with the rapid pace of technological development in 
deciding whether something is in general public use”). 
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insist that police be free from Fourth Amendment limits any time 
they use a technology that is generally available to private 
citizens:  That would mean that, even as enhancements to aerial 
drones and GPS units make these devices a greater threat to 
privacy, their use by police would paradoxically become subject 
to less Fourth Amendment oversight—as long as private citizens 
are able to purchase and use such surveillance technology for 
their own purposes. 
 Use of these remote recording technologies should count a Fourth 
Amendment search, but this is not because these technologies are—
for the moment at least—less widely used, or available to private 
citizens, than SmartPhone cameras.  Rather, it is because remote 
recording technologies allow police to do something they cannot 
easily do with a SmartPhone, which is to generate a “precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements”259—a digital 
archive they can later use to engage in a frame-by-frame search.  
The government might conceivably subject U.S. citizens to such a 
dragnet investigation even without automated recording technology 
that can follow an individual far from where an officer is positioned.  
But doing so is likely to be costly and burdensome for police.  As 
Justice Alito stated in Jones, tracking an individual over a period of 
days without GPS technology is likely to require significantly more 
man power and police resources and is likely to be a far more 
complex operation.260  As Justice Breyer explained in Illinois v. 
Lidster,261 such an investigation may be in less need of 
constitutional restraint because its costs make it subject to heavy 
practical restraints.262 
2. More general technology-centered approaches 
Other scholars have explored ways of defining searches in public 
space that are less expansive but still arguably cover more ground 
than the proposed definition offered in this Article.  Another set of 
recent and promising proposals, for example, come from scholars 
who argued for a technology-based approach to what counts as a 
search.  In contrast, however, they analyze it at a higher-level of 
                                                          
 259. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 260. Id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 261. 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
 262. See id. at 426 (explaining that there is little cause for concern that its approval 
of police information stops would lead to “unreasonable” worry about “proliferation 
of police checkpoints” because “[p]ractical considerations—namely, limited police 
resources and community hostility to related traffic tieups—seem likely to inhibit any 
such proliferation”). 
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generality than in this Article, which focuses on public recording 
(remote or otherwise) and certain types of magnification and 
amplification.  Professors David Gray and Danielle Citron, for 
example, argued for a “technology-centered approach” to determine 
which investigations count as Fourth Amendment searches.263  Their 
test would classify any technology as a search if it “has the capacity to 
facilitate broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that intrude 
upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy.”264  Among the 
technologies that enable such “pervasive surveillance” are “aerial 
drones, GPS-enabled tracking, [and] digital dossiers.”265  These 
technologies, Gray and Citron claim, raise the same specter of 
authoritarianism for modern citizens that “broad and 
indiscriminate use of physically invasive searches and seizures” 
did for our predecessors.266 
Another similar approach that inspired Gray and Citron’s proposal 
is Susan Freiwald’s proposal.  Freiwald stated that courts can mark a 
line between searches and non-searches with a four-factor test that 
the Supreme Court and other courts have developed over the last 
four decades in cases addressing wiretapping or video surveillance in 
homes, offices, or other private spaces.267  Under this test, a method 
of public surveillance would count as a search when it is characterized 
by each (or perhaps, most) of the following elements:  it is (1) 
hidden, in that the target is unaware of it; (2) intrusive, in the sense 
that it “affords law enforcement agents access to things people 
consider private”; (3) continuous, in that it represents an ongoing 
“series of intrusions” rather than a single intrusion by the state; and 
(4) indiscriminate, in that it “gathers up more information than 
necessary to establish guilt.”268  GPS surveillance, she argued, will 
typically count as a search under these criteria because GPS units are 
typically hidden, record myriad details about a person’s movements 
and activities, do so over an extended period of time, and gather 
                                                          
 263. Gray & Citron, supra note 32 (manuscript at 5). 
 264. See id. (manuscript at 5) (elaborating that technology that qualifies as a 
search under this test would then be subject to Fourth Amendment warrant and 
reasonableness requirements). 
 265. Id. (manuscript at 27). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶¶ 9–11 (outlining the details of 
the Four Factor Test, its derivation from case law, and how it promotes the goals of 
the Fourth Amendment); Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32 (summarizing how 
courts essentially apply a four-factor test when analyzing what Fourth Amendment 
protections should apply to a given investigatory method). 
 268. Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32; see also Freiwald, First Principles, supra 
note 32, ¶¶ 61–69 (adding that courts could apply lesser standards to those 
surveillance methods that do not share all four factors). 
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much information unrelated to criminal activity.269  Surveillance by 
an unseen drone would count as a search for the same reason.  Video 
surveillance by street cameras is not hidden to the same extent, as 
pedestrians can often see the cameras on buildings or corners, but it 
otherwise shares the features that make GPS tracking and drone 
surveillance a search. 
Interestingly, the earlier cases that Freiwald relies upon, which 
applied similar principles to cases of wiretapping and video 
surveillance, did not use these criteria to determine whether a certain 
investigatory technique was a search or a non-search.  Rather, courts 
employed these factors to justify imposing certain “heightened 
procedural hurdles,” beyond a showing of probable cause, on certain 
types of unusually threatening electronic searches.270  Still, although 
these criteria were used to determine what hurdles the government 
had to overcome to make a search reasonable, they can be adapted to 
the task of determining what public monitoring should count as a 
search at all.  Although police surveillance in public has traditionally 
been entirely outside the Fourth Amendment’s coverage, when it 
raises the same risks for privacy and autonomy as the most worrisome 
forms of inside surveillance, such as wiretapping or video recording 
from cameras hidden in homes or businesses, then it makes sense to 
bring such public surveillance into Fourth Amendment territory so 
that courts can guard against its possible abuses.  Thus, when public 
surveillance is hidden, intrusive, continuous, and indiscriminate 
(under Freiwald’s test) or capable of broad and indiscriminate 
surveillance (under Gray and Citron’s), it is—just as wiretapping and 
bugging—subject to constitutional limits. 
Such an approach has two advantages that might, to some, make it 
seem preferable to a test that focuses on recording capacity, 
magnification, or some other specific technological feature.  First, it 
has the virtue of offering a single standard that courts can apply not 
only to surveillance in public spaces, but to all kinds of wide-scale 
government surveillance, from wiretapping, to thermal imaging and 
GPS tracking.  Second, like Slobogin’s all-methods-covered approach 
above, Gray, Citron, and Freiwald’s approaches are broad enough 
                                                          
 269. Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32. 
 270. Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶ 10; see, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41, 60 (1967) (developing constitutional rules for electronic eavesdropping in 
part with a focus on that technology’s “inherent dangers”).  As Judge Posner noted in 
applying such criteria to video surveillance, such surveillance was “inherently 
indiscriminate” and “could be grossly abused—to eliminate personal privacy as 
understood in modern Western societies.”  United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 
(7th Cir. 1984). 
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that they easily apply limits to alternative technologies (or low-tech 
analogues) that the government employs to circumvent Fourth 
Amendment limitations.  For example, if police try to circumvent a 
Fourth Amendment restriction on remote recording by sending out 
officers to continuously record activities on dashboard cameras and 
then storing them for later analysis, Gray and Citron’s test would 
likely still give courts all of the doctrine they need to classify such 
recording as a search based on its potential for broad and 
indiscriminate investigation of citizens’ public movements or 
actions.271  Freiwald’s test would also likely classify such widespread 
recording as a search, because it is intrusive, continuous, 
indiscriminate (and, if people do not see the cameras in the police 
cars, also hidden).272  Courts thus would not have to analogize this 
multi-officer use of individual recording devices to hidden 
surveillance from drones or street cameras.273 
                                                          
 271. See Gray & Citron, supra note 32 (manuscript at 5, 12–13, 36) (noting that 
their technology-based approach to the Fourth Amendment should serve as a guide 
to prevent unfettered government recording of the public and limit “broad 
programs of indiscriminate surveillance”).   
 272. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶¶ 9–11 (basing her test on video 
surveillance cases).  Police could use video surveillance technology to continuously 
record the public in much the same way that drones might.  See Freiwald, Four Factor 
Test, supra note 32 (applying the four-factor test and concluding that law 
enforcement officials should seek a warrant before engaging in GPS tracking). 
 273. Such general approaches offer yet another possible benefit:  they may be 
broad enough to cover government collection and analysis of third-party images and 
videos.  Third-party video records could conceivably provide officials with all the data 
they need to create detailed archives of individuals’ activities.  Much of the video 
used in the Boston Marathon investigation, for example, came from the video 
cameras of private businesses and individuals filming the Boston Marathon (or the 
aftermath of the bombing) with their own smart phone cameras.  Kelly, supra note 1. 
Third-party records could be of similar benefit in location tracking.  As Stephen 
Henderson has written, location data has immense value to private businesses, since 
it allows them to discover customer habits and patterns.  Stephen E. Henderson, 
Learning From All Fifty States:  How To Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs 
To Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 
383–84 (2006).  For example, “a business would probably like to know that customers 
spend an average of fifteen minutes in the store.”  Id. at 383–84.  Furthermore, a 
third party’s natural interest in location-tracking, combined with the location-
tracking capacities “inherent in [cell phone] technology,” make it likely that police 
will find all the information they need to track an individual in records already 
collected by private parties.  Id. at 385.  It is thus understandable that the concurring 
justices in Jones were worried not only about officials using public cameras or 
government-installed GPS devices, but also about government collection and analysis 
of third-party-generated data.  Justice Alito, for example, noted that “[m]any 
motorists purchase cars that are equipped with devices that permit a central station 
to ascertain the car’s location at any time” and that “cell phones and other wireless 
devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record the location of users.”  
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  Justice Sotomayor explained that a coherent approach to privacy in 
public may require the Supreme Court “to reconsider the premise that an individual 
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There are, however, two disadvantages to the more abstract 
approach.  One is the opposite of the advantage discussed above.  
The same generality that allows these approaches to more easily cover 
a wide range of investigatory techniques also makes it less predictable 
which techniques will be covered by the Fourth Amendment.  
Consider, for example, some of the questions courts would face in 
assessing whether certain video- or image-capture technology is 
capable of broad and indiscriminate use (under Gray and Citron’s 
test) or “intrusive” (under Freiwald’s).  In defining how broad, 
indiscriminate or intrusive a technology is, should courts consider 
any technological or administrative safeguards (e.g., a rigorously 
enforced restriction on access) that a police department builds into 
its video surveillance system?274  Should they consider use of a 
surveillance technology to be a search if that technology is relatively 
unthreatening in its typical form but can be easily repurposed so as to 
let police engage in more intrusive searches? Do police engage in a 
search, for example, if they use recording systems that blur faces, but 
                                                          
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties.”  Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
Conceivably, a government investigative method that draws on other parties’ video 
footage rather than the government’s might still count as a method that facilitates 
“broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance” under Gray and Citron’s test.  Gray 
& Citron, supra note 32 (manuscript at 5).  Indeed, Gray and Citron suggested that 
their approach would at least cover situations where a private party was acting as a 
state agent, and “that in most cases where government leveraging of private data 
reservoirs would raise [Fourth Amendment] concerns, one or more of the[] tests of 
state agency” would very likely be met.  Id. (manuscript at 45–46).  Of course, such a 
state agency test would likely solve the same problem under the narrower approach 
suggested in this Article.   
If it did not do so, and Justice Sotomayor thus remained correct that effective 
Fourth Amendment protection of privacy requires a reformulation of the third-party 
doctrine, then such a change to the third-party doctrine would not be sufficient, by 
itself, to subject government recording of public activities (or analysis of others’ 
recordings) to Fourth Amendment rules.  The Supreme Court would also need some 
rationale and guidance providing why and when video footage captured in open 
spaces could implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests even when it occurs in 
public and observable space.  After all, if we do not have any account of why it might 
be constitutionally problematic for the government to routinely videotape public 
activities by itself, it would not be clear why it is any more problematic for it to obtain 
the same information from others.  We thus need some approach, like the one this 
Article offers, to explain when and why government recording of citizens’ activities 
would cross a constitutional line; the approach would also have to explain when and 
why gathering the same information from third parties’ recordings might be 
unconstitutional.  Although a more general technology-centered approach can 
certainly serve this role, so too can a narrower test that subjects only remote 
recording and certain instances of magnification or amplification to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny. 
 274. See Gray & Citron, supra note 32 (manuscript at 5) (describing its test as one 
that looks to the potential uses and abuses of the technology as a basis for incurring 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny); Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32 (considering 
potential limits on GPS tracking). 
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where police can easily remove the blurring? Or when they use a 
recording system that can work only if a particular police officer is 
operating it, but which can easily be reprogrammed to record 
continuously and automatically?  
Gray, Citron, and Freiwald’s abstract approaches are also 
problematic in that it is likely to over-expand Fourth Amendment 
coverage.  Freiwald’s proposal, for example, is likely to sweep in more 
police work than the test proposed by this Article because there are 
kinds of public surveillance that arguably satisfy all four elements of 
Freiwald’s test but involve neither recording nor substantial 
magnification of otherwise invisible details on a person, paper, or 
effect.  For example, imagine that an officer in an unmarked vehicle 
becomes suspicious of a car driving in front of him and decides to 
follow a few cars behind on the road for a period of ten or fifteen 
minutes.  There is a good chance this counts as a “search” under 
Freiwald’s test.275  While the officer’s car is visible, he does not intend 
to alert the driver ahead that the government is watching her.  So the 
officer’s observations are hidden.  The officer’s activities are certainly 
also continuous.  The officer is gathering at least some information 
about actions that are unlikely to reveal criminal activity.  Whether 
this activity is sufficiently intrusive to be a search is unclear, but 
without additional guidance for answering this question, courts 
facing it might encounter the same difficulty that the Supreme Court 
encountered in Jones.  Like the proposal in this Article, Freiwald’s test 
avoids making intensity or duration the key determinants of whether 
an investigation is a search.276  Instead, Freiwald directed courts to 
apply these factors to each “method of surveillance.”277  So courts will 
have to decide how to define—and judge—the method of 
surveillance being used in a situation in which the only surveillance 
technology an officer is using to watch someone is the car he is 
driving.  It is possible that if courts conclude that such observation is 
typically non-intrusive, they will define it as a non-search even if one 
can imagine more intrusive variants of it.  But courts certainly have 
more leeway under this test than they do under the test proposed in 
                                                          
 275. See Freiwald, Four Factor Test, supra note 32 (viewing GPS tracking as a search 
and therefore potentially any attempt by police to track drivers as a search for the 
same reasons). 
 276. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶ 69 (focusing instead on the 
continuous nature of a search, not on a specific length of time, and incorporating 
three additional factors into the test). 
 277. See id. ¶¶ 50, 60 (stating that the courts should also make clear 
decisions on what the Constitution demands before law enforcement begins 
using new technologies). 
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this Article to classify as a “search” visual observation by police officers 
that is unaided by cameras or other technology. 
Still, the approaches offered by Gray, Citron, and Freiwald might 
well end up leading courts to define the Fourth Amendment territory 
that the proposal here covers.  Remote recording is certainly capable 
of the broad and indiscriminate use that, for Gray and Citron, is the 
hallmark of a Fourth Amendment search.  Remote recording is also, 
as a general matter, likely to be hidden from the view of the target; 
the police officer doing the recording is not present (and the device 
doing the recording is often not visible).  It is certainly continuous, 
and it indiscriminately captures significant amounts of information 
unrelated to crime.  So it also satisfies Freiwald’s test.  High-level 
magnification of reading materials or other items we assume are 
private is also likely to occur without our knowledge and to be 
intrusive and indiscriminate.278 
Thus, it is plausible to view the proposal set forth in this Article as a 
specific application of the approaches discussed by Gray, Citron, and 
Freiwald, which advocate that the Supreme Court count as a search 
all public surveillance that eliminates the possibility for “private or 
anonymous action” in public space.279  Recording remote events and 
close magnification of details are only two examples of surveillance 
technologies that raise such concerns. 
Yet Courts might offer greater clarity—not just to law enforcement 
agents but to other courts—if they start with such abstract criteria, 
but rather with a test that marks remote recording and high-level 
magnification as searches. This more modest approach also adheres 
more closely to the Supreme Court’s own precedent on surveillance 
in public spaces.280  As noted above, the Supreme Court has already 
stated in its tracking cases that location-monitoring technology may 
count as a search when used in conjunction with dragnet 
information-gathering devices; this might include any device, like 
GPS, that records a person’s movements from one place to another.  
It has noted in its aerial surveillance cases that even when police 
observe a home’s curtilage or a business’s open premises from a place 
where the public has a right to be, their surveillance might still be a 
                                                          
 278. Whether it is continuous is less clear.  See Blitz, supra note 45, at 1383–84 
(indicating that magnification of images caught on video surveillance implicates 
privacy concerns, even if the Supreme Court refuses to lend much credence to such 
concerns); see also Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 32, ¶¶ 69–70 (examining the 
continuousness requirement in relation to e-mails).   
 279. Blitz, supra note 45, at 1446.  
 280. See e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (noting that people 
can reasonably expect reduced privacy on, for example, public roadways).   
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search when it reveals intimate details about a person’s life.281  
Building on such precedent in future cases on public surveillance, 
the Supreme Court may eventually build the framework that marks 
particular investigatory techniques as searches or non-searches based 
upon their general level of intrusiveness or their capacity to 
indiscriminately and continuously capture information.  If and when 
such a framework emerges, this might also allow a link between the 
Court’s emerging Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on surveillance 
in public spaces and its jurisprudence on surveillance of Internet and 
phone communications.  Nevertheless, even if the Supreme Court 
takes a more cautious and minimalist approach, there is a 
technological form- or design-based approach that allows it to 
proceed in extending Fourth Amendment protection to public 
surveillance. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, judges seeking to apply Fourth Amendment law to 
emerging surveillance technologies have faced a dilemma.  On the 
one hand, if they continue to insist on the simple rule that public 
space is a Fourth Amendment-free zone, they seem to betray Fourth 
Amendment purposes.282  While the Fourth Amendment does not, as 
the Supreme Court noted in Katz, establish a “general constitutional 
‘right to privacy,’”283 it does protect us from government fishing 
expeditions whereby police invade the private realms of our life in 
search of details that would justify subjecting us to an arrest or other 
seizure.284  Police cannot arbitrarily sift through the items in our 
house or the documents in our briefcase,285 so it is not clear why they 
should be able to create, and then sift through, video frames of 
people’s day-to-day movements through public space, especially 
because even acts that occur in a public space may betray aspects of 
their lives that are deeply private and personal.  In fact, roadside 
cameras or drones might capture evidence not only of citizens’ 
                                                          
 281. See supra notes 124–133, 207 and accompanying text. 
 282. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing that the Court must retreat from an idea of privacy as 
complete secrecy); id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that 
the majority’s trespassory standard could lead to “incongruous results”). 
 283. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
 284. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967) (explaining that the 
historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to preserve the privacy of the home 
and safeguard against arbitrary government invasions).   
 285. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that the government cannot arbitrarily 
search a person’s “houses, papers, and effects” without probable cause); see also 
Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (prohibiting “arbitrary invasions by the government”).   
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movements, but of their private thoughts.  They might give hints 
about personal internal demons individuals are struggling with when 
they visit a psychotherapist, twelve-step group, or library.  This is 
especially true if the state not only has a record of its citizens’ 
movements, but also video footage that captures facial expressions, 
demeanor, gait, and perhaps (with powerful magnification) the 
documents held in their hands. 
On the other hand, if courts extend the Fourth Amendment into 
the realm of the public and visible, it is not at all clear how far this 
extension should go.  It seems wrong to say that every glance by 
police or every event they observe in the street suddenly activates a 
constitutional force field protecting the subject of their attention; it 
also seems wrong to assume that if police look a bit closer—whether 
by staring for a longer time, donning a better pair of glasses, or using 
their binoculars or iPhone—Fourth Amendment protections 
immediately apply.  The concurring opinions in United States v. Jones 
rightly did not let this difficulty deter them from concluding that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to public space, but they also did not find 
a way to resolve the issue.286  Rather, they assumed that there is a 
vague, yet-to-be-identified line between public surveillance that is 
sufficiently brief to avoid judicial scrutiny of any kind and longer 
surveillance that might count as a “search.”287 
This Article has proposed a way out of the dilemma.  First, whether 
public surveillance counts as a Fourth Amendment search depends 
not on its duration or intensity, but rather on whether it uses 
technology that attempts to do what the Fourth Amendment was 
meant to stop:  dragnet surveillance that creates records of activities 
that police can then sift through for evidence that might justify 
subjecting us to the coercive powers of the state.  In short, this means 
that the Fourth Amendment should first bar the government from 
recording with technologies that inescapably follow citizens through 
public space and record them remotely wherever they can be 
found—no matter how far they may be from the sight or hearing of a 
police officer. Whether that recording lasts only a few seconds or a 
month, it is still a search because, by turning it on, police are 
                                                          
 286. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would not assume that 
all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited 
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”); id. 
at 960–61, 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the determining 
factors for Fourth Amendment protection should include the duration of the 
intrusion and reasonable expectations of privacy, not the presence of a physical 
trespass). 
 287. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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subjecting citizens to a technology that is capable of creating a digital 
archive of evidence about their lives.  To be sure, its brevity may be 
relevant to the question of whether it is reasonable.  Courts may 
decide that such brief recording is unlikely to threaten people and 
should thus be permitted even if police have a level of suspicion that 
is far lower than probable cause.  When the video recording targets 
no one at all and instead simply sweeps in all people and events that 
occur in a given area, then courts might likewise give police more 
leeway to record, as long as it is clear that any attempt to use these 
recordings to trace the path of a particular person triggers the same 
warrant (or other) requirements that would limit targeted 
surveillance in the first instance. 
 
